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We studied the structural determinants of evolutionary dynamics on complex networks in the paradigm of
social dilemma games and mathematical graph theory. Motivated by the renewed interest in the evolution
of altruistic behavior in the population of rational individuals, who strive to maximize their own benefit,
we qunatitatively explored the impact of the various structural characteristics on the fixation of a single
cooperator in the sea of defectors. In non-complete graphs, where an individual’s fitness is determined
not only by the individual’s strategy but also by its local neighbors’ strategies, the fixation of the mutant
species significantly deviates from the prediction of the traditional Moran process occurring in a well-
mixed population. From the numerical experiments and analytical approximations on the ensembles of
populations prescribed by a suite of structural characteristics, we map the region of facilitated altruism in
the space of degree heterogeneity, clustering properties, and degree-degree correlations. Of particular
interest are the attributes of the seed cooperator that leads to the fixation of cooperators with higher
chance. We show that, though the degree of the seed cooperator can either positively or negatively impact
the cooperation depending on the numeric details of the payoff matrix, the low average degree, degree
homogeneity, and the negative degree-degree correlation is always favoured for the evolution of the social
behavior. To explain these findings in a more intuitive manner, we introduced the concept of the structural
reciprocity in the framework of evolutionary game theory and propose possible structural intervention
strategies to promote the altruism with no centralized control. To avoid hasty generalization at all costs,
however, it should be noted that the underlying population topology is not the only determinant of the
fixation of cooperators. Yet another determinants are the details of the update rules and fitness-payoff
relations. The interplay between these dynamical rules and the structural characteristics should be a
fruitful avenue for future research.
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Structure and function and their interplay lies at the core of all the disciplines of science. Diversity of
the scientific disciplines emerge when this fundamental scheme is combined with distinct spatial and
temporal scales inherent to the system of our interest. As the patterns of condensation of atoms and
molecules are related to the thermal and electromagnetic properties of condensed matter, and intrigue
the chemists and material scientists, structural biologists are intrigued with the detailed combination of
structural motifs producing wide range of catalytic power and specificity facilitating the biochemical
reactions in a living cell.
Owing to the recent technological advance in high-throughput experiments and large-scale computa-
tion, unprecedented amount of data have been accumulated. Paradigm is rapidly changing from genes to
genomes, parts to systems, and intra- to inter-disciplinary. But a bucketful of beads are not a treasure
until threaded, goes an old Korean saying.
In addition to the sequence database, huge collections of protein crystal structure, protein-protein
interaction, transcriptional regulation, and pathway data have been archived and keep gaining their content
across the species. The wiring diagram is getting more popularity thanks to its abstraction power and, to
be sure, system-wide assay and statistical analyses based on large-scale graphs have provided valuable
insights into the “design” principles. However, when it comes to the efforts to manipulate cell’s metabolic
capability for engineering uses, many caveats behind the abstract modeling start to override the desired
outcome. Even the simplest circuit device, such as an oscillator took two years to be realized in its naive
functional fidelity [1].
Networks are an abstract mathematical construct of all the interacting systems, regardless of the
nature of their “nodes”. The local and overall structure can be evolving over time, reflecting the dynamics
in both the nodes and links. The macroscopic behavior of large and complex biological systems as an
outcome of accumulated or majority of microscopic actions from system components. Those microscopic
2 Introduction
Fig. 1.1 Example of complex network. Any of complex systems can be described in from of networks. A
node of network represent a consisting component and a link indicating interaction between a pair of
parts. For example, a social network represent interaction patterns among consisting of individuals. The
macroscopic behavior of the system depends on the interplay between microscopic dynamics through the
links and the pattern of interactions. Figure adopted from [2].
actions propagate and stimulate through interacting path ways under the governing dynamics and thus the
pattern of interactions across system components determines overall behavior. Hence finding the structural
determinants of a functional network is crucial to the understanding of biological networks responsible for
genetic regulation, cellular metabolism, and intra-cellular signal transduction. The evolutionary rationale
behind these evolved structures allows us to reverse-engineer the complex biological systems for various
engineering applications [3].
Likewise, the topological structure of a population, which is itself a manifestation of social and
ecological interactions, may well have significant impact on the spreading of, say, epidemics, innovations,
and social influence [4–6]. Accordingly, any public health strategies or regulatory measures aimed to
control the spread of diseases should consider the population structure in which the interacting agents
are embedded. This is particularly so because the social networks are known to be far from uniform or
completely random in the connectivity patterns [7].
3
Fig. 1.2 Tree of life. Form of the life have been evolved through the evolutionary processes over the
billions of years. Every branches in the tree of life representing the emergence of new kind. The emergence
of new kind at each stage of the era, survived in fitter form of the life under the natural selection. However,
many of evolved creatures cooperate each other, even build up the eusociality that requires the sacrifice of
individuals for the common goods that leads reducing the fitness of individual. How the cooperation can
survive under the natural selection is the largest question in evolutionary biology. Figure is used under
the permission. The copyright © Leonard Eisenberg 2008, 2017 (https://www.evogeneao.com/)
Meanwhile, across all fascinating researches about biological systems the evolution is at the center of
scientific mind. Every living organism evolve over the time. We don’t know yet what is the origin of life
on the mother Earth, but at least we dimly know how the form of life has been changed through the history
of the earth. From the prokaryotes to the multicellular organism, evolutionary processes repeated again
and again over the billions of years and derived changing the form of life and the diversity. Regardless
the type of biological system, the actual form of reactions or interactions in ecosystem, the evolution
conceptually summarized three main processes which are replication, selection, and mutation.
The main property of evolutionary process lies on the emergence and the extinction. Throughout an
eternity of time millions of thousands form of life appeared and disappeared. Since the Earth is dynamic
system at each stage of the era the environment of the Earth have been changed. Under the dynamic
changes of environment living organisms were drifted by the natural selection. The natural selection
simply favours the fitter and the fittest, which leads ”the survival of fitter” [8]. However, the life is also
dynamic system. Throughout uncountable number of mutations let the life evolve into another forms.
That unwilling ’mistakes’ is the source of the diversity in life.
At the same time, the life start being ’strategic’ for survival under the selection. From a single cell to
multi-cell, from an individual to a group, and from a group to a society, the life start cooperate to each
other. However, the cooperation is risky behavior since it requires sacrifice oneself to provide goods for
others. In terms of the fitness cooperation is an action reducing the fitness of oneself. The natural selection,
4 Introduction
Fig. 1.3 Schematic representation of evolutionary process in (a) in well-mixed population and (b) in
structured population. Contrast of an individual represent the fitness. The natural selection favours fitter
type of individuals. However, interplay between the dynamics and structure may lead different destination
of evolutionary processes. In this dissertation we mainly focus on how such interplay effect on the
emergent phenomenon.
therefore, dose not favour the cooperation. One may wonder ’when’ the cooperation of life started, ’how’
cooperating individual can survive compensation, ’what’ initiated the evolution of cooperation.
The evolution of cooperation out of natural selection is an emergent phenomenon that cannot be
reduced to the understanding of pairwise two-body interactions. How could economically rational agents
pursuing their own interest achieve the common good of cooperation with no centralized coordination?
How do individual cells in multicellular organisms choose to cooperate at its own cost instead of
proliferating autonomously? [9] The mathematical abstraction of these questions laid the foundation
of evolutionary game theory [10–12], which now provides a paradigm for the dynamics of competing
strategies not only in biology but also in social and behavioral sciences.
Both empirical evidence and theoretical analysis for the social dilemma games highlight that coopera-
tion emerges when a certain type of “assortment” is at work that allows the benefits of altruistic acts to be
preferentially channeled to other altruists and/or partly fed back to the original altruists [13, 14]. Leaving
out the strategic complexity [15, 16], the direct and indirect reciprocity [17–19] formed by iterated social
interactions is one of the dominant mechanisms for the evolution of altruism. Assortment by virtue
of kinship [20–24] or group selection [25–38], though being at the center of the heated controversy
between schools of thoughts [39, 40], have also been widely accepted mechanisms. Other factors that
can potentially play a significant role include the voluntary interaction [41, 42] and mobility-assisted
mechanism [43, 44].
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A fundamental, yet largely unanswered question is the role of the spatial reciprocity [45–48], which
stems from the physical limitations in the range of social interactions or population dispersal. Unlike
the other mechanisms, spatial reciprocity does not require actors’ cognitive abilities for discriminating
among interaction partners. Earlier studies showed a general tendency that the restricted interaction
range or increased social viscosity promotes cooperation [45, 49]. Moreover, heterogeneity in degree
distribution, as in most real-world networks, has been attributed to either increased or decreased level
of cooperation[50–56]. Other studies tried to relate the topological properties of social network such as
degree-degree correlation and clustering coefficient to the degree of cooperation. However, despite the
volume of research from a wide range of perspectives [57], it still remains largely unanswered which
structural characteristics are responsible for enhanced or suppressed cooperation.
Based on above curious we are motivated to explore the emergence of cooperation on structured
populations. To investigate how structural characteristics effect on the selection of cooperation we employ
the evolutionary graph theory which synthetic approach of the complex networks and the traditional
evolutionary population dynamics. Interestingly it had been shown the structural characteristics of
populations can changes the drift of selection [58]. In addition to the evolutionary graph theory we apply
the game between individuals and tried to expand recent understanding of the network reciprocity based
on the selection dynamics.
The structure of this thesis is following: In chapter 2, we briefly overview definitions and concepts of
the complex networks which describing topological characteristics in interest to discuss how structural
properties of population influence on the evolutionary process and the evolution of cooperation. Methods
for generating a desired graph also discussed. In chapter 3, we will review essentials in the evolutionary
dynamics from the differential equation that describing replication, selection and mutation to the stochastic
dynamics in finite and fixed sized populations. Based on the evolutionary graph theory the interplay
between dynamics and interaction patterns will be discussed. In chapter 4, we will discuss the evolution of
cooperation based on the game theory with the 2×2 payoff matrix. After looking over known mechanisms
which allows the selection of cooperation, we will explore the effect of the degree-heterogeneity and the




Throughout this dissertation, individuals and social interactions thereof, such as given in social dilemma
games, are represented as a mathematical graph composed of nodes and links among them. Intensive
and extensive research effort has been poured for the last decade to the structure of social networks. In
his seminal book [59], based on his own experiments, Steven Milgram proposed the hypothesis of “six
degrees of separation’’, claiming any individual is connected by any other individual by six steps of an
acquaintance network on average.
Another milestone observation from the classic quantitative sociology was the so-called “strength
of weak ties’’. Unlike the late structures, social networks are not uniform in a sense that individuals’
connection is not more or less the same. They contain the nodes of relatively loose connections as well as
densely connected subnetworks which constitute an almost complete graph in a local neighborhood.
2.1 Introduction
A complex network is a graph representing the topological feature of a given complex system that com-
posed of individual parts and connections among them. During the past decades researchers investigated
many of real systems with huge spectrum of interests. Representative of examples are the internet, the
world wide web, the power grid networks, the metabolic networks, the protein-protein interactions, the
functional brain networks, the social networks based on the social media and in personal relation, the
coauthor ships, and the transportation networks [60–68]. As the consequence of empirical explore the
variety of systems across the fields, soon after it had been discovered that complex systems sharing the
topological feature in their pattern of connections which is the heavy-tailed distribution of the number of
connections among the individual parts. In other words, the degree distribution follows the power law
such as, where the k is the degree, i.e. the number of connections of a component has. From the most of
8 Complex Networks
empirical studies it had been found that the value γ , the degree-exponent, in the range of 2 < γ < 3. Such
networks are so-called the scale-free networks [61].
The “Scale-free network” means that there is no “scale” characterizing a given network. Compare to
the classical random networks which the degree distribution follows the Poisson distribution introduced
by Eldos and Renyi, the average degree cannot explain well the scale-free networks. This “scale-freeness”
characteristics were attracted to statistical physicists because the power-law appears in the critical behavior
in a physical system in terms of phase transition. For example, the correlation length in the paramagnetic
system follows the power-law at the critical temperature. This leaded the theoretical approach to study
complex networks in the physical and the mathematical society and the hundreds of papers were published.
Population in biological and social systems have a spatial structure meaning limited interaction
patterns. This spatial stricture can be described in context of complex network based on the graph theory.
An individual of population can be represented as a node and interaction patterns between any two
individuals can be represented as a link. The number of link, a node have is the degree of node. Then any
given structured population can be represented as a complex network.
2.2 Definitions and concepts
Formal definition of a graph is a set G consisting of two sets, the set of vertexes or nodes, V , where an
element, i, is a single part of consisting components and the set of links, or edges, L, which consists of
pair of vertexes, (i, j) that have connection between them.
A =

0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0
1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0
0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

Fig. 2.1 Simple graph and its corresponding adjacency matrix, A.
Adjacency matrix
All information of a given network can be stored in a matrix. The matrix is, so called, the adjacency
matrix, A, where each element of the adjacency matrix, ai j, is given by
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ai j =

1 if (i, j) is connected,
0 otherwise
(2.1)
For undirected graphs, the adjacency matrix is symmetric, ai j = a ji, in which the direction of a link is
ignored or considered as bidirectional for a given pair. The elements of adjacency matrix, ai j can be a
real number to represent weighted edges, for example the strength of interaction between a pair of nodes.
A =

0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0

Fig. 2.2 In this figure, the element of adjacency matrix, ai j, represent connection from i to j.
Structural characteristics of a given network can be measured as numbers by manipulating of the adjacency
matrix. Following concepts and definitions are used to represent structural characteristics in interest
throughout in this dessirtation.
Degree


















The probabilistic interpretation of the degree distribution, P(k), is the probability that a node of degree k
is choosen by random chose. The degree sequence is another construct of the same information as the
degree distribution. The degree sequence is the set {k1,k2,k3, . . .} of degrees for all nodes. The degree
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distribution, or the degree sequence of a given graph tell us information that how connectivity of the
graph is distributed, however, it does not tell us complete structure of a network.
Assortativity
The assortativity, usually denoted by r in network science community, is the Pearson-correlation coeffi-








+ ⟨(kl + k′l)/2⟩2
(2.5)
where kl and k′l are the degrees of two end-nodes of a link, l, respectively and the average ⟨. . .⟩ is over
the set of all links. Roughly speaking, if r > 0, the pattern of connections between nodes of the given
graph has a tendency that nodes with similar degrees are linked each other, such networks are called
assortative networks, or assortatively degree-mixed, whereas r < 0, reveal the opposite trend, and called
disassortative. When r = 0, it is called neutral [70].
Clustering coefficient





number of pairs that connected among neighbors of i
number of possible links among neighbors of i
(2.6)
The local clustering coefficient of node i reflects the tendency of friends of i are also friends to each other.
If the local clustering of node i, Ci For a given network, the average clustering coefficient is the mean of






The similarity is the concept that represents the structural equivalence between a pair of nodes. Consider
two nodes, say i and j, that are sharing many of common neighbors but are not connected. In this case,
i and j are structurally equivalent or structurally similar in a sense that interactions or influence from
neigbors that i and j would feel or information about neighbors that i and j would know will be similar
because they both know many of same neighbors commonly, even not directly connected [7]. For the
2.3 Structural characteristics of complex networks 11










2.3 Structural characteristics of complex networks
Degree heterogeneity
In crude terms, The degree has a role of importance, or influence of a node in many studies. We may
wonder how the degree is distributed. The degree distribution, P(k) give us the answer. Depends on
the distribution broadness, the feature of network can be classified into one of two catagolies. The
homogenous networks, in which the distribution sufficiently narrow near to the mean degree, or, the
heterogenous networks, where the distribution is broad enough so that the average degree is far away as
the representative. Especially, if the degree distribution follows a power low for large k, such that,
P(k)∼ k−γ (2.9)
the network is called the scale-free network [72]. The exponent, γ , usually called the degree-exponent and
used to indicate the degree heterogeneity. It had been discovered that many of real networks of systems in
biology, engennering, internet, and social interactions have the scale-freeness in common and the degree
exponents of such networks laid on the range, 2 < γ < 3 [73].
Fig. 2.3 Visualized (a) Erdős-Rényi (ER) and (b) Barabáshi-Albert (BA) networks. ER is representative
the degree-homogeneous structure which the degree distribution has form of the Poisson distribution,
P(k) = λ k/k!e−λ ,λ = k and BA representative as the degree-heterogeneous structure with P(k)∼ k−γ ,


















Fig. 2.4 The degree distribution, P(k), of the Erdős-Rényi (ER) and the Barabáshi-Albert (BA) networks.
Each network is the representative of the degree-homogeneous (ER), and the degree-heterogeneous (BA)
structure. Figure obtained from independently generated 5,000 networks size of 1,000, k = 4 using each
model.
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Degree-mixing
The joint distribution, P(k,k′), defined by the probability that a randomly selected link has two end nodes
with degrees k and k′ respectively, provide more detailed information compare to the degree distribution,





reveals the lack of two point correlation, and deviation from it represents the existence of the degree-degree
correlation.
Alternative way to show the degree-mixing is measuring the average neighbor degree as a function of









where the conditional probability, P(k′|k) corresponds to the probability that the degree of randomly
chosen neighbor of node with degree k is k′. In general, increasing ⟨knn⟩ corresponds to the assortative
mixing, decreasing corresponds to the disassortative mixing. In some cases, it turns out ⟨knn⟩ can be
represented by another power law [75, 76],
⟨knn⟩(k)∼ kµ . (2.12)
















































Fig. 2.5 The averaged degree of nearest neighbors, knn(k), as function of the degree of ’ego’ node for
each level of the degree-heterogeneity (left, γ = 2,5, middle, γ = 3.0, right,γ = 5.0) and the assortativity
(see the legend). The cross point placed at the average degree of the networks, k = 4. Based on definition,
knn(k) ∝ k, however, in case of the most heterogeneous structure (left), knn is decreasing as k increasing
for high degree nodes which represent minority of massively connected hubs.
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r = -0.12














































(a) γ = 2.5
r = -0.24


































(b) γ = 3.0
r = -0.75














































(c) γ = 5.0
Fig. 2.6 Log-scaled joint distribution, P(k,k′), from different level of the degree heterogeneity, (a) γ = 2.5,
(b) γ = 3.0, (c) γ = 5.0, and different level of degree-mixing. The joint probability obtained from the
ensemble of 200 independently generated network samples size of N = 1000, with the average degree,
k = 4.
2.3 Structural characteristics of complex networks 15










































Fig. 2.7 Clustering distribution, C(k), of each characterized networks. From left to right the corresponding
degree-exponents are γ = 2.5,3.0,and 5.0 and the averaged clustering coefficient C ∼ 0. The distribution
of clustering depends on the level of degree-mixing. Assortative configuration, r > 0, have the distribution
that very low clustering around low degree nodes while relatively high clustering around high degree
nodes. Disassortative mixing have opposite form compare to assortative and neutral mixing is in between.
Relatively high clustering distribution among highly connected nodes in assortative mixing contributed
viscous connection pattern among them.
Clustering
Based on definition of clustering coefficient [77] many of previous studies on real network reported
that real networks showing high clustering compare to the prediction of random graph theory [77–80],
however, the mechanism explaining collective forming of interaction is not well understood yet. It is also
reported that in many real world networks the local clustering distribution, C(k), defined by the average
local clustering coefficient of nodes of degree k, shows a scaling, [80–83]
C(k) ∼ k−β . (2.13)
In many cases the exponent fit to β ∼ 1 [81], and termed the hiearachical clustering [83].
Relation between structural characteristics
Definitions discribed in previous section try to capture a certain structural characteristics in large scale
networks. In fact, however, there are relations between definitions and also each defnition has the
limitation. For example, the clustering coefficient and the degree-mixing. It had been reported that the
clustering drives the assortativity in the model study [84], in which high clustering coefficient among the
highly connected node naturally contribute to the positive degree-degree correlation as shown in Fig. 2.7.
On the other hand, the positive and negative degree-mixing decrease or increase structural similarity
between a pair of nodes as shown in Fig. 2.8.
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r = -0.12











































(a) γ = 2.5
r = -0.24































(b) γ = 3.0
r = -0.75











































(c) γ = 5.0
Fig. 2.8 Averaged cosine similarity between pair of nodes with degree ki and k j for various degree
heterogeneity, (a) γ = 2.5, (b) γ = 3.0, (c) γ = 5.0, and different level of degree-mixing. The ensemble of
networks used to obtain figure is same that were used for Fig. 2.6. Figure shows that very high level of
similarity in the assortative configuraton compare to the disassortative, especially between high degree
nodes.
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2.4 Generation of networks
Through out this dissertation we are going to focus on the effect of the degree-heterogeneity and the
degree-degree correlation on the evolutionary dynamics and the emergence of cooperation. For numerical
simulation on variously characterized networks as the combination of the degree-heterogeneity and the
degree-mixing, we employed following methods for generating desired complex networks. Generation of
a network consist of generating the degree-sequence , which controlling the level of degree-heterogeneity
and tuning detailed characteristics. Finite sized un-directed and un-weighted network size of, N, with
average connectivity, k will have N nodes and L = Nk/2 links and corresponding information of network
will be stored in the adjacency matrix size of N×N with components. Technically what we do is, therefore,
generating the adjacency matrix.
2.4.1 Generation of degree sequence
Random graph
Erdős-Rényi introduced the random graph model in 1959 [85, 86] and studied is a statistical ensemble
whose members are all possible labelled graphs of given number of nodes N and links L, and all these
members have equal statistical weight. To generate ensemble of networks size of N and the average
degree of k or L = Nk/2 links, we simply iterate random linking between randomly chosen two nodes,
until the total number of link reached L. As the results, the degree-distribution of random graph will
follows the Poisson distribution,
P(k) = λ k/k!e−λ , (2.14)
where, λ = k.
Barabáshi-Albert model
The Barabási-Albert (BA) model or scale-free network model is the model which reproduce power-law
degree distribution based the algorithm, called the preferential attachment [73]. The model is growing
model in which starting from small number of initial configuration, at each step we add a node, say i, and
build links from i to already existing node. The node i choose its neighbor, say j, with the probability





Using the BA model, one can generate the degree sequence which follows the power-law degree distribu-
tion, P(k)∼ k−γ , with the degree exponent γ ∼ 3.0.
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Static model
For a configurational model, each of the N nodes is assigned an index n ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N} and the corre-
sponding weight n−α , where α ∈ [0,1). Then selecting a pair of nodes u and v according to the normalized
weight u−α/∑Nn=1 n
−α and v−α/∑Nn=1 n
−α and connect the two half-edges unless one already exists. By
repeating this pairing process up until mN edges are formed, we obtained a scale-free network of degree
distribution PD(k) ∝ k−γ with the mean degree 2m. From the analytic relation between α and γ [87], we



















Fig. 2.9 The degree distribution P(k) of generated scale-free networks with desired degree-exponents
using the static model. Figure obtained from the ensemble of 5,000 independently generated network
samples, size of 1000, and the average degree, k = 4. As the degree-exponent, γ , decreases the degree-
distribution more fat-tailed.
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2.4.2 Tuning topological characteristics
Degree-preserved rewiring
Tuning detailed characteristics of network can be achieved by rewiring process. To obtain various levels
of degree-degree correlation, we introduce random rewiring of edges in a degree-preserving manner [76],
through which the desired sign and magnitude of assortativity of a graph can be asymptotically tuned.
More specifically, we try to construct an ensemble of graphs that have the maximum entropy (or maximal
information) among all the graphs specified by a value of assortativity, and degree distribution. In analogy
with the canonical NV T ensemble for a thermodynamic system, we consider the network “Hamiltonian”
H (G) such that the probability distribution over a set of graphs is given by [88, 89]
P(G) = Z−1e−H (G) , (2.16)
where Z is the normalization constant and the Hamiltonian is directly proportional to the assortativity.
• Degree-mixing Hamiltonian Since the only term allowed to vary in Eq. 2.5 for a given degree





ai jkik j , (2.17)
where J modulates the sign and magnitude of the degree-mixing pattern. As the magnitude of J
increases in a positive (negative) direction, the degree-degree correlation of the “equilibrium” or
maximum entropy graph becomes more assortative (disassortative) and eventually saturates to the
maximal (minimal) value allowed for a given degree sequence.
Fig. 2.10 Schematic description of degree preserving rewiring. Randomly chosen two pairs of nodes,
(1,2) and (3,4) are going to be rewired as (1,3), (2,4) depend on the difference between Hamiltonians,








































































































































































































































































Evolutionary Dynamics on Graphs
In this chapter, we review the basic concepts of population dynamics and the mathematical framework
for capturing the evolutionary processes occurring on structured populations. We model the structure
or pattern of social interactions as mathematical graphs, where the nodes represent individuals and the
(un)directed links interactions among individuals. We consider a variety of dynamical processes taking
place in a general population and try to seek the correlations between the dynamical processes and the
underlying population structure.
3.1 Introduction
Evolution in population is a dynamical process which consists of replication, selection, and mutation [90].
Individuals in population reproduce their offsprings by giving same genetic information or identity. Based
on what identity or genetic information an individual has, its fitness is given, which describes individual
the rate of reproduction. In such a process the selection comes naturally as a domination of population by
a specific identity or species, which may have the highest fitness among all kinds in the whole population.
Such an emergence phenomenon is understood as main mechanism of evolution in nature.
The evolutionary dynamics is the mathematical tool to describe the evolutionary process. It has the
form of the coupled differential equations or the form of the stochastic processes. The deterministic
equations mostly used to describe behavior and to understand of evolutionary systems of large size, which
large enough to describe the consists of a population with continuous variables. In this case we focus
on the domination of population by a certain type, which have the fittest fitness among composition. On
the other hand, the stochastic version of evolutionary system, in which closely related to interest of this
thesis, is very powerful tool to understand the emergent properties in the population of finite size.
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3.1.1 Evolutionary process
Evolutionary system evolve based on three processes, replication, selection, and mutation. Subject of
replication in evolutionary theory mainly a genotype which delivered from a parent to its offspring as form
of giving birth. In consequence of an error during replication, mutation occur and it derives the biological
diversity. During the processes the selection only allows the survival of fitter, since the resources in
environment is limited. In this subsection we review above evolutionary processes in large sized and
unstructured population system with deterministic equations to understand the logic governing nature.
Replication
Suppose we have population that growing with a rate, α , and die out with a rate, δ . Dynamics of this
population is given by,
ẋ = (α −δ )x (3.1)
and thus, equation of population growth is,
x(t) = x0e(α−δ )t (3.2)
The equation tells the population will grow indefinitely as long as α > δ . However, in real world there
are limitations due to the competition for finite resources allowed by environment. This is captured by
the carrying capacity, K, quantifying the maximum population level that can be sustained by the given
environment. Then, the population dynamics is modified to,
ẋ = rx(1− x/K) (3.3)
The equation of population growth with carrying capacity is given by,
x(t) =
Kx0eαt
K + x0(eαt −1)
(3.4)
In the limit of infinite time, t → ∞, the population size converges to the limit, x∗ = K.
Selection
Selection functions whenever more than two types of individuals reproduce at different rates. Suppose we
have population consists of two types, say x, and y with corresponding rate of reproduction, α for x, and
3.1 Introduction 23






y(t) = y0eβ t
(3.6)




= (α −β )ρ (3.7)
ρ(t) = ρ0e(α−β )t (3.8)
If α > β , ρ will exponentially increase, meaning x will out compete y over time.
Let consider a situation that the total population is constant. For the fixed sized population, say,
x+ y = 1, and now x, and y represent the relative abundance of each kinds.
ẋ = x(α −φ)
ẏ = y(β −φ)
(3.9)
where, φ = αx+βy ensures x+ y = 1. φ is the average fitness of the population. Now, let y = (1− x),
we obtain,
ẋ = x(1− x)(α −β ). (3.10)
The equation has two stable points, at x = 0 and x = 1. At these points, ẋ = 0. If x = 1, the population
consists only of x type and if x = 0, the population consists only of y.
• Selection - the survival of the fitter: From Eq. 3.10 we can observe that if α > β , then ẋ > 0 for
all values of x, between 0 and 1, 0 < x < 1. It means that for any of mixed population, consisting
of x and y with certain fraction of each, the relative abundance of x will increase if the fitness of x
is greater than the fitness of y. At the end the fraction of x will converge to 1, while the fraction of
y will converge to 0, "the survival of fitter".
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Mutation
During the process of reproduction errors can occur, and those errors are called mutation. Consider again
a population consists of two types, x and y. Let assume that x and y have same reproduction rate. Denote
by uxy the mutation rate from x to y, and uyx the mutation rate from y to x. uxy is the probability that the
reproduction of x result in y. The population system evolve following equations,
ẋ = x(1−uxy)+ yuyx −φx
ẏ = y(1−uyx)+ xuxy −φy
(3.11)
Since x and y have same fitness, the average fitness of the population is constant as φ = 1. Using x+y = 1,
the equation reduced to,
ẋ = uyx − x(uxy +uyx). (3.12)





As the consequence of mutation, the population become mixed state of x and y. At stable point, the ratio
between x and y is given by x∗/y∗ = uyx/uxy.
In some cases the mutation rate in one direction is much higher than in the other direction. If mutation
from x to y is much higher than mutation from y to x, type x will keep decreasing and finally y will take
over the population. As the result, different mutation rates can lead selection even without differences of
fitness.
In general, we can consider population with n different types. Denote by ui j the mutation rate from
type i to j, we have the mutation matrix, U = [ui j]. Since each type reproduce itself or other type,
∑
n





x ju ji −φxi i = 1,2, . . . ,n (3.14)
using vector notation,
˙⃗x = x⃗U −φ x⃗ (3.15)
Again the average fitness, φ = 1, the equilibrium, x⃗∗, is given by the eigenvector associated to the
eigenvalue 1:
x⃗∗U = x⃗∗. (3.16)
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Fig. 3.1 Schematic discription of the Moran process
3.1.2 Evolutionary processes in finite population
So far we have looked the overview of evolutionary processes in terms of differential equations with
continuous variables. In this subsection we consider evolutionary process in a population of fixed size. in
finite populations, the scheme based on continuous variable, which described the fraction of a certain
type of individuals, is no longer suits since we will count each type of individuals as integers. For finite
sized population we consider the dynamics in terms of stochastic processes. That is the Moran process,
invented by the population geneticsit P.A.P. Moran in 1958 [91].
Moran process
In Moran process, the size of population, N, is fixed. It consist of two random processes, the birth and the
death. At each time step one individual randomly selected with probability proportional to its fitness and
reproduces its offspring which the identical type, and another one randomly chosen for being replaced by
the offspring from the one who chosen for reproduction so that the size of population is fixed.
Fixation probability
Consider a population size of N. At certain time point mutation has occurred, and now we have N −1 of
the wild type, say W , and 1 of the mutated type, M. The mutated type has the relative fitness, r, compare
to the wild type. We may wonder the probability of the whole population is going be conquered by a
single mutated type. This probability is called the fixation probability.
The Moran process of this case can be formulated by the transition matrix, T , with elements Ti j. Ti j
is the probability that the state of the system is going be changed from state i to state j. The process
laid on the states space, m = 0,1,2, ...,N, where m represents the number of mutated type, M. From the
definition of the Moran process allowing increasing or decreasing one mutated type at each step, the
corresponding the transition matrix is given as follows:
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T N+1×N+1 =























0 0 0 . . . 0 0 1

(3.17)
where, T±m is the probability that mutant, M, increased(+) or decreased(−) from the state m. Denote by
ρm the probability of reaching state N starting from the state m. We have,
ρ0 = 0
ρm = T−m ρm−1 +(1−T−m −T+m )ρm +T+m ρm+1 i = 1,2, . . . ,N −1
ρN = 1
(3.18)
Note that the states, m = 0 and m = N are absorbing state, because once the system has reached one of
two states, it will stay there. Therefore, the population will be taken over by the mutant or the mutant will
be wiped out at the end. Let the variable φm such that
φm = ρm −ρm−1 m = 1,2, . . . ,N, (3.19)





Denote by γm = T−m /T
+
m the ratio between transitions for decreasing and increasing from the state m.
From the iterative relation,
φ2 = ρ1 −ρ0 = ρ1
φ1 = ρ2 −ρ1 = γ1ρ1
...
































































































Hereafter we denote the fixation probability of the wild type by ρW,1 and the fixation probability of the
mutant type by ρM,1. Note that the fixation probability for a single individual of the wild type is equal to
the probability that N −1 of mutant failed take over the population pool, ρM,N−1, therefore, the fixation




































Hence, the ratio of the fixation probabilities is ρW/ρM = ∏N−1m=1 γm. If the product smaller than 1, ρW < ρM ,
meaning a single the mutant type more likely take over the population of the wild type compare to the
contrary case. In general, the ratio between type A and B, ρA/ρB is the indicator of the time spend that
the population is governed by whether type A or type B [92].
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Drift and selection
Consider the case when the mutant arise with the constant relative fitness, r, compare to the wild type.
The transition probabilities of increasing or decreasing the number of mutant population when the system
in the state m are given by,














m = γm = 1/r for all m, and the sum of products in denominator reduces to the sum of





One can notice that the chance of extinction for the advantageous mutant always remains, compare to
the deterministic models of evolution in which regardless how small r, as long as r > 1 the mutant take
over the population. As the result of the stochastic process, the fixation probability identifies a balance
between natural selection and the random drift [58, 8].
In this case the relative fitness of the mutant, r = 1, the fixation occurs with the probability 1/N.
It is called the neutral drift, meaning the probability that the population become a lineage of a certain
individual is one over the size of the population. Since all individual have the same rate of reproduction
and death, the chance leave a pedigree to the whole population is 1/N. If the population contain i of
certain type, the fixation of the type will be i/N.
Fig. 3.2 Evolutionary process in a finite population size of N. The initial population were identical until
sudden mutation appear with relative fitness r. Through the stochastic drift and selection, population
evolve until it reach one of two absorbing states; all-W or all-M. Fixation of mutant occur with the
probability, ρM(r,N).
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Fig. 3.3 The Moran fixation probability, ρM(r,N), as the function of the relative fitness of mutant for each
size of population. The Moran fixation probability measure the probability that population taken over by
a single mutant of relative fitness r introduced to initial wild-type population. Unlike the deterministic
system described by differential equation, the stochastic evolutionary process in finite sized population
has the extinction probability for fitter as 1−ρM(r,N) for r > 1 and also the fixation probability of inferior
for r < 1. The balance between drift and selection depends on the size of population and the fitness of
invader. As the size of population increases, the selection become stronger.
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Fixation time
One may wonder how long does the stochastic process take time until the system reach to one of absorbing
states. The time is called a fixation time. For the case of Moran process, we have three different fixation
times. τm: The average time until the population system reaches to one of two absorbing states, all-M or
all-W from the state m. τMm : The average time until the population system reaches to all-M state from the
state m. τWm : The average time until the population system reaches to all-W state from the state m. τm is
the unconditional fixation time that doesn’t consider the final state, while τMm and τ
W
m are the conditional
fixation times corresponding final states. Notice that usually the distribution of fixation times broad,
depending on the size of population and the relative fitness of mutant type. τm,τMm ,andτ
W
m represent the
mean of the broad distributions.
Unconditional fixation time, τm: Analogous to the fixation probability, the fixation time have the
recurrence relation and the boundary values,
τ0 = 0
τm = 1+T−m τm−1 +(1−T−m −T+m )τm +T+m τm+1
τN = 0
(3.29)
Introducing the variable, ζm = τm − τm−1, the recurrence relation can be rewritten as,




where γm = T−m /T
+
m again. From the iteration one may yields,
ζ1 = τ1 − τ0 = τ1
ζ2 = τ2 − τ1 = γ1τ1 −
1
T+1

























ζk = τ j+1 − τ j + τ j+2 − τ j+1 + · · ·+ τN − τN−1 =−τm (3.32)
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where, ρ1 is the fixation probability given by Eq. 3.24. Therefore, the average unconditional fixation time

























Conditional fixation time, τMm : Following Ref. [93], for the conditional fixation time that the popula-
tion system reach to all-M from the state m start from,
ρ0τ
M







m−1 +1)+ρm(1−T−m −T+m )(τMm +1)+ρm+1T+m (τMm+1 +1)
ρNτ
M
N = 1×0 = 0
(3.36)
where ρm is the fixation probability of m mutant individuals. Denote by ηMm = ρmτ
M










One can notice that Eq. 3.37 has the identical structure compare to Eq. 3.30. Therefore, using similar
iteration as above and using the boundary values, η0 = 0 and ηN = 0, we obtain,
η
M



















k −ηMk−1 =−ηMm (3.38)
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Conditional fixation time, τWm : For the conditional fixation time that the population system reach to
all-W from the state m, we can obtain from the symmetry argument, in which τWm count the time opposite














































Suppose we have a population size of N. At initial stage the population in equilibrium that all individuals
are identical type, W , thus, producing offspring with the same rate. All of a sudden with very rare chance
a mutation occur during reproduction. The mutation rate, u, represents the probability that an individual of
type W reproduce its offspring as M. What is the required time that this population system totally replaced
by a newly introduced mutant type, M? The average rate of mutant appearing from the reproduction of
population is Nu, thus the time of mutant occurrence exponentially distributed with the average 1/(Nu).
Assume that the newly introduced mutant type M has a relative fitness r compare to the initial






The rate in which a mutation occur is Nu, and the probability that mutant take over the population is ρ .
Therefore, the rate of evolution from all-W to all-M is given by,
R = Nuρ (3.44)
If introduced mutation is neutral, the fixation reduced to ρ = 1/N, and the rate of neutral evolution is
given by, R = u, where the rate of neutral evolution is simply equals the mutation rate, independent of the
population size. This result was derived by Mooto Kimura and is at the center of the neutral theory of
evolution. The neutral theory address that the majority of mutations should be neutral. Since advantageous
mutations in genes are extremely rare which optimized throughout thousand of thousand generations,
pernicious mutations are not able to observe because those have high probability of elimination. Therefore,
the majority of mutations in any phylogeny should be neutral [94, 95].
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3.2 Evolutionary processes on graphs
Traditional approaches assume that the population is well-mixed, meaning all individuals are in equivalent
environment and have identical interaction among them. However, In many of real world observation
suggests the importance of interaction patterns which can be captured as a network. Interpretation of a
local interaction could be geometrical formation of population, such as the architecture of cells in a multi
cellular organism, or geographical distribution of habitation for animal species. Human society is also far
from well-mixed population. Such localized interaction limit the competition range of birth and death
processes. Our main interest is how the interplay between evolutionary dynamics and the population
structure will make differ the outcome of evolutionary processes.
3.2.1 Evolutionary graph theory
Evolutionary graph
To describe the evolutionary process on structured population, we introduce the stochastic matrix, W ,
which the element of the matrix, wi j, is representing the probability that the offspring of i take over the
site of j, with labeling all individuals in the populations as i = 1,2, . . . ,N. The matrix, W , is stochastic
with following properties:
0 ≤ wi j ≤ 1,
∑
i
wi j = 1.
(3.45)
The matrix, W , defines a weighted and directed graph and it is called the evolutionary graph [58].
If wi j > 0, there is and directed link from node i to j, while if wi j = 0, there is no link from i to j. The
evolutionary process is now depends on the N ×N matrix W = wi j. We can generalize the Moran process
in finite sized population as the special case of the complete graph with identical weights, wi j = 1/N, for
all i, and j.
Temperature of node






The temperature of node i represents the sum of incoming probability flow of offsprings from its
neighbors. If a node, i has a high temperature, it will be changed or updated more offten compare to a
node has a low temperature.
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Isothermal theorem
If all nodes in the evolutionary graph have identical temperature, then a graph is isothermal, in the sense
that all nodes in a graph equally likely ’hot’ likewise the concept of isothermal state of an object at the
thermal equilibrium in the thermodynamics. The isothermal graph have the property that the fixation
probability of the evolutionary dynamics on it same as the fixation probability of the Moran process of
the same size [58].
Theorem: "a graph is fixation equivalent to the Moran process if and only if it is isothermal"
Let describe the configuration of a population using a binary vector, s⃗ = (s1,s2, . . . ,sN), where si
denote the type of population as si = 0 for the wild type, and si = 1 for the mutant type. Then the number
of mutant type is given by m = ∑i si. The probability of increasing one and decreasing one mutant type




wi j(1− s j) =





wi js j =
∑i ∑ j wi j(1− si)s j
rm+N −m
(3.47)
If the ratio, γm = T−m /T
+
m on a given evolutionary graph is identical to the ratio from the Moran process,
γm = 1/r, the fixation probability of the mutant with the relative fitness r on the graph will be the Moran









wi j(1− si)s j (3.48)
for any configuration of s⃗. Especially, for all configuration with, sk = 1, si = 0, i ̸= k the equality in
Eq. 3.48 must be held. In such cases,
∑
j
wk j = ∑
j
w jk, for all k (3.49)
By definition, ∑ j wk j = 1, and we have, ∑ j w jk = 1. Therefore, if the matrix of evolutionary graph, W ,
is doubly stochastic, the graph is isothermal and the fixation probability on that graph identical to the
Moran fixation. Examples of isothermal graphs are represented in Fig. 3.4. In particular, a symmetric
graph, where wi j = w ji for all i,and j is isothermal. A circulating graph, where ∑Nj=1 wk j = ∑
N
j=1 w jk for
all k meaning that the incoming and outgoing weight is identical for all nodes, is also isothermal graph.
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Fig. 3.4 Examples description of the isothermal graphs. (a) and (b) the lattice of k=4 and k=3. (c) Well-
mixed graph size of N = 4 (d) and (e) are examples of the circulation graphs, where the graph such that
the inflow and outflow of the directed replication rate is same at all vertexes. Figure adopted from ref [58].
3.2.2 Selection amplifier, suppressor
Moreover, of particular interest are two specific classes of graphs, namely selection amplifiers and
selection suppressors. A graph, G, is called an amplifier of selection, if superior mutants (r > 1) have
a higher fixation, ρGM(r) > ρ
Moran
M (r) and mutants with lower fitness (r < 1) have a lower fixation,
ρGM(r) < ρ
Moran
M (r) compared to the Moran fixation, on this graph. Some examples for amplifiers of
selection are given in [58], e.g. the star, the superstar or the funnel.
The mechanism of selection amplifier could be understood as follows. Let consider a star graph. In
case of star graph, most of the seed mutant appear one of leaf node. At the beginning the mutant-type has
very low probability for giving birth but the death-probability is much lower than that. Since the death of
the seed mutant requires two event at the same time which are the birth of the wild-type at the center
and chosen for being replaced. Therefore, the seed mutant survive with high probability and when it
chosen for giving birth it send its offspring to the center. The spread of mutant to other leaf node happens
if luckily when the center node chosen for the birth with the mutant type. As increasing the number
of mutant among the leafs the probability that the center has the mutant type will be higher. So finally
the mutant type takeover the population. Superstar is double layered star graph, so the amplification of
selection get stronger. However, If the seed placed at the center node, it will more likely replaced by
wild-type offspring since the center is "hot" spot but the chance that the seed mutant appear at the center
is very low.
Conversely, a graph, G, is called a selection suppressor, if, compared to the Moran fixation probability,
advantageous mutants (r > 1) have a lower fixation ρGM(r) < ρ
Moran
M (r) and disadvantageous mutants
(r < 1) have a higher fixation probability ρGM(r)> ρ
Moran
M (r) on this graph. Examples for suppressors of
selection are mostly source and sink populations, such as one-rooted graphs or hierarchical tissues. In
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such cases there is no chance that the seed takeover the population unless it appear the root. Therefore,
regardless the relative fitness, selection is suppressed.
Fig. 3.5 Examples the selection amplifier. (a) Star and (b) the super-star. On the star graph, most of the
seed mutant appear one of leaf node. At the beginning the mutant-type has very low probability for giving
birth but the death-probability is much lower than that. Since the death of the seed mutant requires two
event at the same time which are the birth of the wild-type at the center and chosen for being replaced.
Therefore, the seed mutant survive with high probability and send its offspring to the center when the
chance has come. The spread of mutant to other leaf node happens if luckily when the center node chosen
for the birth with the mutant type. As increasing the number of mutant among the leafs the probability
that the center has the mutant type will be higher. So finally the mutant type takeover the population.
Superstar is double layered star graph, so the amplification of selection get stronger. Figure adopted from
[58].
Fig. 3.6 Examples the selection suppressors. From (a) to (d) there is the ’frozen’ node that never be
replaced by others in terms of the temperature. Unless the invasion started at those spot the population
never be taken over by newly introduced mutant. Figure adopted from [58].
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3.3 Interplay between evolutionary dynamics and population structure
So far we have looked the overview of the evolutionary graph theory which classifying structured
populations into three categories, the isothermal graph, the selection amplifier and the selection suppressor.
Introducing limited interaction pattern among individuals in a population changed the possibilities that by
whom an individual will be replaced from every one can be replaced by anyone. The theory, however, is
valid only for the Moran process in which the sequence of the update rule is "birth-death" and the limited
interaction localized the death part. We investigated the interplay between flipped order dynamics, which
is the death-birth, and structured population. In this case, the competition for giving birth is localized.
3.3.1 Birth-death vs. Death-birth
Compare to the birth-death, in the death-birth process we choose one of individual among a population
in random for the death and the next we choose another individual proportional to its fitness for the
birth. In the well-mixed population flipping order of the dynamics doesn’t change the ratio of transition
probabilities, γm = T−m /T
+
m . Since, we have,



















































As we can see if the size of the population get larger, N → ∞, the fixation probability of the death-birth
will converge to the fixation probability of the Moran process, ρDBm → ρMoranm . However, when the size of
the population is small the difference is not ignorable.
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Fig. 3.7 Schematic representation of the global and the local competition under the birth-death (left) and
the death-birth (right). The domain of yellow and blue represent the competition pool for the reproduction
and the death, respectively. Under the birth-death i send its offspring to j with the probability, wi j, when it
chosen for reproduction. In case of the death-birth, the probability that i achieve the evolutionary success
for the node j is proportional to its fitness, fi when individual at node j is chosen for the death.
3.3.2 Results
Fixation probabilities
To confirm how the flipping order of the dynamics changes the behavior of selection on the structured
population we performed the numerical simulations of the selection dynamics on the set of structured
populations. First, Fig. 3.8 and shows the fixation probabilities on simple graphs. As we confirmed
from the analytic form of the fixation probability of death-birth (DB), ρDBm is lower than the fixation of
birth-death (BD), ρBDm even in the well-mixed. The gap between the fixation probabilities are independent
from the size of the population that we used, which are N = 25,49,100. The set of isothermal graphs,
the well-mixed, the ring, and the lattice return the Moran fixation under the BD while under the DB the
selection of mutant suppressed relatively. Especially in case of the star structure, which is the selection
amplifier under the BD, totally suppressed the selection of mutant even with high relative fitness r ∼ 2.5.
In case of the generalized structures with the degree-heterogeneity and the degree-mixing also the
selection is suppressed under the DB as shown in Fig. 3.10 (a),(c), and (e). The effect of the degree-
heterogeneity under the DB turned out as the more heterogeneous, the more suppressed. Interestingly,
the effect of the degree-mixing is not significant, but under the BD negatively degree-mixed structures
enhance the selection of mutant while under the DB the effect is opposite. Why under the death-birth
dynamics the selection is suppressed on structured populations and why the effect of the degree-mixing is
not aligned?
3.3 Interplay between evolutionary dynamics and population structure 39


































































Fig. 3.8 The fixation probability of single mutant on simple graphs under the birth-death (BD) and the
death-birth (DB) dynamics as a function of the relative fitness of invading mutant, r. As increasing r, the
gap between ρBDM and ρ
DB
M increases from all tested structures. The isothermal graphs under the Moran
processes no longer have same fixation probability compare to well-mixed population. Of particular
interests, the star graph, (f) the amplifier under the BD become the suppressor under the DB.
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Fig. 3.9 The conditional fixation time, τFixedM , on simple graphs from the birth-death (BD) and the death-
birth (DB) dynamics as a function of the relative fitness of invading mutant. The time represented in
the scale of the Monte-Carlo step(τM/N). The fixation time is size dependent. Results represent that the
difference in τM under the BD and DB on structured population are ignorable except the star graph. In
case of the star the fixation time very long under the BD while very short under the DB.
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Fig. 3.10 The fixation probability, ρM and the conditional fixation time, τFixedM from a single mutant
under the BD and the DB on structured populations of each level of the degree-heterogeneity and the
degree-mixing. The gap between ρBDM and ρ
DB
M is slightly increased as the degree-heterogeneity increased.
The degree-mixing affect on the fixation as following. Under the BD, the negatively degree-mixed pattern
slightly increases the selection of mutant while the positively correlated pattern suppresses. Under the
DB the effect is opposite.
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Fig. 3.11 The diagram of influence of node. When individual j is death its neighbors join the competition
for giving birth. The evolutionary success of individual i is proportional to the fitness. The sum over the
potential probability that the individual i achieve the evolutionary success for spots of its neighbors at
each time step defined as the influence of i.
Flipped order of the dynamics changed the scale of the competition in each time step as shown in
Fig. 3.7. Under the brith-death, The competition pool for the reproduction is global but the death of
an individual only possible when one of its neighbor selected for reproduction, in which it is localized.
The temperature of a node, Ti, defined as Eq. 3.46, captures which node is more often being replaced
by its neighbors. If the temperature of a node is high, the spot will be chosen more often for the death.
However, in case of the death-birth process, the chance of the death is equivalent to every individuals as
1/N. Therefore, there is no more "hot" or "cold" spot.
Influence of node
Instead, the globalized pool of death utilized as the structural advantage of reproduction for a highly
connected individual while it is disadvantage for a less connected individual. That is because, a highly
connected individual will have more chance to join a competition for reproduction, since, a competition
for reproduction happens when one of its neighbor is dead, and the probability that one of neighbor is
selected for the death proportional to the degree, k. At the same time, a competition for reproduction is
limited only for the nearest neighbors of the empty site.
To capture this structural inequality we defined the influence of a node for the death-birth dynamics.
Contrary to the temperature of a node from the evolutionary graph theory, the influence of a node measure
the capability of evolutionary success at each time step. The evolutionary success of an individual i occur
when i is selected for reproduction at that local competition. Therefore, the influence of an individual i
can be formulated as the sum of the probabilities that i become a winner at each local competition, which
i potentially participating.
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Fig. 3.12 Averaged influence for the neutral selection as function of the degree of node, ⟨I(k)⟩ from each
level of the degree-heterogeneity (from left to right, γ = 2.5,3.0,5.0) and the degree-mixing. ⟨I(k)⟩ is
identical to ⟨T (k)⟩ under the neutral selection. Figure obtained from the network ensemble of N = 400,
k = 4 independently generated 200 samples.















where, Hk j∈Ni is the harmonic mean over degrees of i’s neighbors. Interesting point is that the temperature












Fig. 3.12 is showing the influence of structured population under the neutral selection. We can notice that
the influencer under the DB process is the hot spot under the BD process from the relation between the
temperature and the influence of node.
Based on understanding of the influence of node, now we can argue about the results from the star
graph. In case of the star the center node is hot spot under the BD, meaning that it is influencer under the
DB. Unless the seed mutant placed at the center node the evolutionary success of mutant is very difficult
under the DB, since, the center node monopolize reproduction whenever its neighbor is dead and even
the competition for the center spot occur, the evolutionary success of mutant at leaf is very rare, because
the scale of competition for the center is global (N − 2). Therefore, the star structure is the selection
suppressor under the DB.
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Fig. 3.13 The conditional fixation probability as the function of the degree of seed, kseed , ρM(k) on
structured populations with γ = 2.5, and each level of degree-mixing. Under the BD the fixation probability
inversely proportional to the degree of seed, ρM(k)BD ∝ 1/k while under the DB, ρM(k)BD ∝ k. Figure
obtained from 105 of simulations on 10 independently generated network samples, size of N = 400, with
k = 4.
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The star graph is the typical extreme case. Expanding similar logic to the results from the degree-
heterogeneous and the degree-mixed populations, we can observe the seed effect. Fig. 3.13 represent the
conditional fixation probability, ρM(k), when the degree of seed mutant was k under the BD and DB for
networks of each level of degree-mixing with the degree-exponent γ = 2.5. Under the BD process the
fixation of mutant more likely to occur when the seed placed lower degree nodes. Since the temperature
of node is proportional to the degree, we could expect the survival of invading mutant is easier with
lower degree in the degree-heterogeneous structure. Contrarily, under the DB the evolutionary success of
mutant proportional to the degree of seed. We could confirm from the results that the utilized structural
advantage of reproduction to highly connected individual outperform other causes. Consequently, the
inequality between fixation probabilities on structured populations, ρBDM > ρ
DB
M , is because of the majority
of low-degree nodes in the degree-heterogeneous structures.
Fixation times
Of particular interest we also examined the fixation time on the structured populations. Fig. 3.9 and 3.10
(b),(d), and (f) shows the averaged conditional fixation time, τFixedM , on each characterized structures.
Structures in the class of isothermal graphs the fixation times were longer commonly compare to the
well-mixed population. Under the DB the fixation times are same. In case of the star graph, the fixation
time is longest under the BD and shortest under the DB. The set of population structure characterized
with the degree-heterogeneity and the degree-mixing represent not much differences across the structural
character, however the fixation take longer under the BD than under the DB.
How does the fixation time has meaning in the evolutionary dynamics? If the fixation time is longer
than the rate of mutation the rate of evolution no more same as the rate of mutation as we discussed in
previous section. Since the rate of evolution assumes that the scale of the fixation time is much smaller
than the scale of the inverse rate of mutation. In our simulation, we restricted situation that no mutation
occur during the dynamics but if the fixation take longer than the time of mutant appearance, during the
selection dynamics one can expect the other mutation. Therefore, further investigation on the effect of
structured population on the fixation time and the rate of evolution could be worth.
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3.4 Summary
In summary, we have looked the overview of the evolutionary dynamics from the traditional perspective
to the interplay between the microscopic dynamics and the limited interaction of populations.
Compare to the Moran process as the standard of the selection dynamics, the structured population can
be classified into three classes, the isothermal graph, the selection amplifier, and the selection suppressors.
Isothermal theorem provide the analytic tool to distinguish a population structure whether the fixation
probability of a given graph will be identical to the Moran fixation or not. The temperature of node
identifies the spot which more likely to be replaced of a given graph. Significantly, the selection amplifiers
commonly have the hot spots and the selection suppressors have the node of zero temperature.
We examined the death-birth dynamics which has the opposite sequence compare to the traditional
Moran process. Flipped order of the dynamics changed the domain of competition at each step, the
death and the birth, in return, under the DB isothermal graphs have suppressed fixation probability
than the well-mixed. As the special example, in case of the star graph, one of the selection amplifier,
became the selection suppressor under the DB. From the set of characterized populations in terms of the
degree-heterogeneity and the degree-mixing, also the fixation of mutant suppressed by the flipped Moran
process.
Under the DB the temperature of node is meaningless. Instead the influence of node measure the
potential capability of an individual’s reproduction success under the DB. Interplay between the DB and
limited interaction in return the structural advantage of reproduction for highly connected individuals.
Consequently under the DB the evolutionary success of mutant more likely happens when the seed has
higher degree while under the BD it is inversely proportional to the degree of seed.
Chapter 4
Evolution of Cooperation on Structured
Populations
4.1 Introduction
Game Theory was formulated to study human behavior and economic decision making by J. von Neumann
and O. Morgenstern [96]. It is a suit of mathematical models of strategic interaction between rational
decision makers and has been applied not only to the subfields of social science but also to logic and
computer science. The traditional game theory concerns the behavior of two game players who try
to maximize their payoff in a game by choosing either cooperation or defection without knowing the
counterpart’s strategy.
The evolutionary game dynamics, combination of the evolutionary dynamics and the game theory,
was developed to address the seeming paradox of the ubiquity of cooperation in the biosphere [10].
In the evolutionary game theory, we considers a population of individuals interacting via a game with
fixed strategies rather than reasonable choice. An individual in a population plays a game with another
individual at a time and gets payoffs from the games witheach of the neighbors. The accumulated payoff
of an individual determines the fitness, a measure of success in reproducing the offsprings. One who
has higher payoff will reproduce more offsprings compared to the one with a lower payoff. Therefore,
success in the game represents the success of reproduction.
Cooperation or altruism is, however, a behavior that provides benefits to others at his/her own cost.
On the other hand, a defector dose not provide any benefit to the counterpart but seeks a chance of
exploitation. Thus, it is trivial that cooperation is not favored in the natural selection since cooperators
always have lower fitness than defectors [90]. However, cooperation exists in nature and human society
in various forms [97–99, 15, 100].
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4.1.1 Frequency-dependent selection
Unlike in the evolutionary dynamics, in this situation the fitness of an individual is not a constant, but
depends on the fraction of individuals playing game with one of two strategies. Let consider we have
population consists of individuals playing one of two strategies, say A and B. The strategy of an individual
is fixed. Individuals interact each other equaly likely, meaning population is well-mixed. Fitness of an
individual is given by the sum of all payoffs from games played with others.
Corresponding payoff given by the payoff matrix Eq. 4.1. For the simplest game with two strategies,
we have 4 combinations of strategies, thus payoff matrix is 2×2 matrix. If A meets A, both get a. If B






When the fraction of A individuals in population is xA and for B is xB, the expected fitness for type A,
fA and B, fB is given by,
fA = axA +bxB
fB = cxA +dxB
(4.2)
Now we have the selection dynamics for the population of A and B which is given by,
ẋA = xA[ fA(⃗x)−φ ]
ẋB = xB[ fB(⃗x)−φ ],
(4.3)
where x⃗ = (xA,xB) and φ = xA fA(⃗x)+ xB fB(⃗x), the average fitness. Since xA + xB = 1, represeting x = xA
system reduced to,
ẋ = x(1− x)[ fA(x)− fB(x)] (4.4)
Plug the fitness function into the Eq. 4.4, we have,
ẋ = x(1− x)[(a−b− c+d)x+b−d]. (4.5)
The behavior of the system can be classified into five catagories depending on the order relation of the
elements in the payoff matrix.
• A dominates B: If a > c and b > d, the average fitness of A always surpass that of B for any
composition of the population. Selection will guide the system to the state the whole population
consist of A.
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Fig. 4.1 Five possibilities of frequency dependent selection with two strategies. The ranking of entries in
payoff matrix decide behaviors of the given system.
• B dominates A: As the opposite case to above, If a < c and b < d, B will dominates A.
• A and B are bistable: In case of a > c and b < d, A is the best against A and B is the best against





The destiny of the system depends on the initial condition, if x(0)< x∗, system will converge to
all-B, and if x(0)> x∗ it will converge to all-A.
• A and B coexist: If a < c and b > d, the best strategy for an individual always the opposite strategy
against partner. In this case the system will converge to the stable equilibrium, x∗, given by Eq. 4.6.
• A and B are neutral: If there is no difference between playing A or B, the system simply reduced
to the neutral. Whatever the initial composition was, it will be not changed, therefore, any mixture
of A and B can be an equilibrium.
The dynamics, Eq. 4.3, that we used to describe behavior of population with a game is called the
replicator dynamics [101–103]. In general we can expand the dynamics with n strategy game.
4.1.2 Evolutionary stable state
The evolutionary stable strategy an important concept liked with the replicator dynamics, invented by J.
Maynard Smith [11]. Suppose we have a large population of individuals with strategy A. At certain time
point a single mutant with strategy B introduced. Then the game between A and B is given by the payoff
matrix ( 4.1). We may ask the condition for selection to oppose the invasion of B into the population of A.
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A single mutant of B in a large population considered as infinitesimally small, express the fraction of
B as ε . The fraction of A then 1− ε . The Fitness for each A and B is given by,
fA = a(1− ε)+bε
fB = c(1− ε)+dε
(4.7)
Therefore A outcompete B if the fitness of A is greater than the fitness of B, fA > fB and we have,
a(1− ε)+bε > c(1− ε)+dε (4.8)
cancelling ε inequality reduced to,
a > c (4.9)
However, if a = c, inequality leads to,
b > d. (4.10)
Therefore, strategy A is ESS if either (i) a > c or (ii) a = c and b > d. The definition ensures that
selection will block the invasion of B into the population of A.
Nash Equilibrium
For any given game, or technically for a corresponding payoff matrix, there is an equilibrium point as the
result of reasonable choice of players, that is the Nash equilibrium, the concept of the Nobel prize winner,
J.F. Nash [104]. Suppose we have two individual and each individual can take one of two strategies.
Again, employ the general 2×2 payoff matrix ( 4.1), the Nash equilibrium defined by following criteria:
• A is a strict Nash equilibrium if a > c.
• A is a Nash equilibrium if a ≥ c.
• B is a strict Nash equilibrium if d > b.
• B is a Nash equilibrium if d ≥ b.
If both players play a strategy correspond to a Nash equilibrium, any of two cannot escape from that
strategy and increase payoff. Suppose the strategy A is a strict Nash equilibrium. Then the strategy is also
ESS. In case of a = c and b > d, the second criteria that the strategy A is ESS, A is a Nash equilibrium.
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Fig. 4.2 Defectors are favored in natural selection. In a mixed population, defectors, D, always have a
higher payoff than cooperators, C. Therefore, the population of Cs are reduced continuously until they
are extinct. Figure adopted from [8].
4.1.3 Prisoner’s dilemma
The game mostly employed for studying evolution of cooperation is the Prisoner’s dilemma game. The
payoff matrix for the Prisoner’s dilemma is given by,

C D
C b− c −c
D b 0
. (4.11)
For each game, a cooperator pays a cost, c. Playing against cooperator earn a benefit, b. Thus, a cooperator
playing against a cooperator earn b−c, a defector playing against a cooperator earn b and mutual defection
earn nothing. In the Prisoner’s dilemma, defection is a strict Nash equilibrium.
The Prisoner’s dilemma game captures the essential problem of cooperation. Mutual cooperation will
earn higher payoff compare to mutual defection, however, defection against cooperation can have the
highest payoff. Therefore cooperation is not rational which is the dilemma.
4.1.4 Five mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation
If we plug in the Prisoner’s dilemma game into the evolutionary game dynamics the selection always
favour defection rather than cooperation, therefore, without any mechanism cooperation cannot survive.
However, there are five known rules that cooperation can be favoured [90], which are the kin selection,
the direct reciprocity, the indirect reciprocity, the group reciprocity, and the network reciprocity. About
the network reciprocity, we will discuss in the next section.
Kin selection
Idea of kin selection is that cooperation can be favored if the two individual of a cooperative act are
genetic relatives. Assume a population where the average of relatedness among individuals is r, which
representing the probability of sharing the same gene. From the concept of inclusive fitness there is
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additional payoff to relatives which the payoff for its donner multiplied by r. Based on the idea we have
the modified payoff matrix

C D
C (b− c)(1+ r) br− c
D b− rc 0
. (4.12)
Now, the condition for evolution of cooperation is b/c > 1/r, which is the Hamilton’s rule [20].
Direct reciprocity
In case of repeated Prisoner’s dilemma game it had been asked “what is the best strategy?” by Axelrod [15].
Studies discovered that the answer is the "Tit-for-tat(TFT)", where cooperation for cooperators and defec-
tion for defectors [105–107]. Consider we have population playing "TFT" and "All-defection(ALLD)".
TFT will cooperate at the first game for ALLD, but from the second playing it will defect against ALLD.
Therefore, the payoff for cooperators using TFT is b− c, and for defectors, −c only for the first game,
and 0 for both. Denote by w the probability of playing another round between two same individuals, the
average number of games is given by, 1/(1−w). The payoff matrix reduced to,

C D
C (b− c)/(1−w) −c
D b 0
. (4.13)
The condition that cooperation to be ESS is given by, b/c > 1/w.
Indirect reciprocity
Indirect reciprocity have been developed to address the cooperation behind human society. Individual
decide to cooperate the other or not based on one’s reputation [18]. The basic idea is that cooperation
increases the reputation of cooperator while defection decreases. In this frame, we have defectors and
cooperators who cooperate based on reputation of the individual to indicate a defector. With the probability
of knowing one’s reputation, q, a cooperator always cooperating to other cooperators, and helps defector
with probability 1−q. The concept leads the payoff matrix to,

C D
C b− c −c(1−q)
D b(1−q) 0
. (4.14)
Thus, if b/c > 1/q, cooperation is ESS.
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Group reciprocity
Expanding the scope of selection from the individual level to the group level, the group reciprocity
arise [26]. The model describing group selection is following.
A population split into m groups. Each group can have n individuals at maximum. Individuals interact
each other among group members. Cooperators pay a cost c at each interaction and earn benefit b from
each interaction with other cooperators within the group. Defectors pay nothing and earn benefits. The
fitness of an individual is given by 1−w+wP, where P is the payoff and w is the selection strength. At
each time step an individual from the whole population selected for giving birth proportional to its fitness
and its offspring added to its group. If the group reaches the maximum capacity, n, with probability p,
that group divided and one random group erased to keep the total population is less than nm. If the group
is not divided with probability 1− p, one random individual from whole population selected for death.
The fixation probability from a single cooperator take over the whole population is the fixation probability
for take over a group times the fixation probability of the group which a seed cooperator included.
The fixation probability of single cooperator among n−1 defectors to take over its group is given by
φC = [1/n][1− (b+ cn− c)w/2] (4.15)
and the fixation probability of single cooperator group among m−1 defector groups is given by
ΦC = [1/m][1+(b− c)(m−1)w/2] (4.16)
under the weak selection, w ≪ 1. The criteria, the selection favours cooperation is ρC > 1/nm, and since
ρC = φCΦC, we arrive to
b/c > 1+[n/(m−2)]. (4.17)
Since the fitness of group of cooperative individuals is higher than the fitness of selfish one the group of
cooperative one will be selected.
4.2 Evolutionary game dynamics on graphs
So far we have looked the overview the evolutionary game theory. Our main interest is how structure
of population affects on the evolution of cooperation. The limited interaction among individuals can
cooperators coexist with or outcompete defectors without any complexity of strategy. The effect called
the spatial reciprocity [45]. The spacial reciprocity usually indicate the effect of symmetric structures
such as lattice. The generalized version of spacial reciprocity is the network reciprocity.
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4.2.1 Network reciprocity
The network reciprocity was introduced by Ohtsuki based on the pair approximation on regular graph [49].
The core finding from the pair approximation is that if a structure of population has the average degree
of k, the average number of cooperators around a cooperator is one more than that of defectors. To
outcompete defector with higher fitness, therefore, the benefit from extra cooperator must exceed the total
cost. The condition is,
b/c > k. (4.18)
The network reciprocity based on the death-birth update rule. In case of the birth-death update, which
is the traditional Moran process, cooperation never be favoured. Noteworthy that the condition exactly
indicate the threshold benefit cost ratio, b/c∗, for the degree-homogeneous networks, in which the fixation
probability of randomly placed a single cooperator overcome the neutral selection, ρC > 1/N.
Further studies on the degree heterogeneous networks discussed that the heterogeneity actually
suppresses the selection of cooperation. According to the study, since the competition occurs between the
nodes that are two steps away, it was pointed out that based on the pair approximation should be modified
to the mean neighbor degree instead of the mean degree [108]. Based on conjecture the condition for










where, ⟨knn⟩ is the average degree of nearest neighbors, and σ2k = ⟨k2⟩− ⟨k⟩
2 is the variance of the
distribution P(k). Hence, the heterogeneity becomes extra burden for population-wide cooperation. In
“scale-free” networks characterized by P(k) ∝ k−γ with a fixed mean degree ⟨k⟩, σ2k in Eq. 4.19 sharply
increases with decreasing γ . Notice that σ2k ∼ (γ−2)−2 as γ approaches 2. That is, the more heterogeneous
in degree distribution, the rarer the fixation events. However, above discussion only holds when we use
the death-birth update rule.
4.2.2 Imitation update
The main stream in studies of evolutionary game dynamics on structured population divided into two
groups. One use the asynchronous death-birth update, which update one individual at one time step, and
measure the fixation probability under the weak selection. The other one use the synchronous update
scheme, which update whole population together for each time step without the weak selection and
measure the fraction of cooperators in steady state. For the later case several update functions were
suggested and representative is the imitate the best. The concrete scheme is in following way,
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• At initial stage, cooperators and defectors are randomly distributed with same probability.
• At each time step, all individuals play game with their neighbors and get payoff, Pi. With that
payoff update their strategy as following,
• individual i choose one of its neighbor, j, in random and i imitate strategy of j with the probability,
Pi j =

(Pj −Pi)/max{ki,k j}b if Pi < Pj,
0 otherwise
(4.20)
• Repeat until the population reach to the steady state.
Interestingly based on synchronous update, the scale-free networks were much better than other kinds
to sustain the high level of cooperation under the high temptation to defect [51, 50, 53, 52, 109, 110].
The high level of cooperation in the scale-free population were maintained by high degree nodes, the hubs.
Since a hub is highly exposed to population it has higher chance to meet cooperators. If a hub defects its
payoff will instantaneously increased but soon it will lose its cooperating neighbors. As consequence the
payoff of defector hub will be decreased and later it will imitate again cooperation. Once the hub became
a cooperator, its payoff will be keep increased by neighbors which imitating cooperation from the hub
and therefore the level of cooperation maintained. Thus, cooperation take successfully hubs.
The difference between update rule can be interpreted as different perspective. In case of synchronous
imitation update scheme, scholars were trying to describe the human behavior in which try to maximize
one’s payoff from comparison with others. However, in this case a node have higher payoff than all of its
neighbor never update its strategy. When the population structure is degree-mixed, neither assortative nor
disassortative mixing shows higher level of cooperation compare to neutral mixing (Fig. 4.3). In case of
assortative mixing one observed sudden drop of cooperation fraction when temptation to defect increased.
In assirtative mixing hubs compare payoff and imitate more likely from other hubs, therefore, if defector
hub appeared with relatively high payoff the cooperating cluster of hubs can be break down easily. In
case of disassortative mixing, since a hub is isolated from other hubs there is very rare chance that the
payoff of hub is lower than its neighbors. Meaning in disassortative mixing the initial strategy become
the final strategy for most of high degree individuals (Fig. 4.4).
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Fig. 4.3 Averaged fraction of cooperators as function of temptation to defect, b based on imitation update
on scale-free networks. Each network were tuned for desired degree-mixing and clustering. We used BA
algorithm to generate population size of, N = 5000, and the average connectivity, k = 6. 10 networks were
independently generated for each configuration. The level of cooperation averaged over 100 generation
after 5000 of incubation periods.
































































































(f) r = 0.25,c = 0.75
Fig. 4.4 Averaged fraction of cooperators among nodes of degree, k at each level of temptation, b for
characterized structures. In disassortative mixing, the fraction of cooperators in high degree class, k > 20,
is remained as initial strategy. The majority of low degree nodes are mostly connected to hubs, the total
fraction at high temptation can be sustained (a), (b). In case of assortative mixing, temptation leads
breaking of reciprocal relation in hub community and thus losing cooperator clusters as shown in (e) and
(f). The clustering doesn’t have critical impact but little bit helpful to maintain higher level of cooperation
due to tightly clustered reciprocal links.
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4.2.3 Death-birth update
Despite many of discussions about the effect of structured population on maintaining the level of
cooperation, it is still unclear that how the degree-heterogeneity and the degree-degree correlation affect
on the evolution of cooperation. To address that point we explored the selection dynamics on complex
population structures based on following scheme. Results and discussions will be presented in following
section.
Simulation scheme
To understand more precisely we simulated the death-birth dynamics on the set of generated networks
based on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game under the weak selection. To adjust a single parameter for the





≡ Π . (4.21)
Each individual on a given network is assigned an accrued payoff from the interaction with the neighbors.
The fitness of an individual i, Fi, is proportional to its payoff, Pi,









where, w is the selection strength in range of 0 ≤ w ≤ 1. The weak selection means w is much smaller
than 1. So under the weak selection the payoff contribute on the fitness only a small portion. Again, in
the death-birth dynamics on a graph at each step randomly chosen individual dies and around neighbors
compete to take over the empty site proportional to its fitness.
Criteria of selection
To justify whether cooperation is favoured in selection or not we measure the fixation probability of
randomly placed a single cooperator, ρC. If ρC > 1/N, we say the cooperation is favoured. We also
measured the threshold benefit cost ratio of a given network, b/c∗, which the point cooperation started
being favoured. It is a indicator to show a given network is facilitative or not for the evolution of
cooperation.
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Fig. 4.5 Fixation probability of cooperator, ρC, as a function of b/c on structured populations. The
corresponding degree exponent to each window is γ = (a) 2.5, (b) 2.75, (c) 3.0, (d) 3.5, (e) 4.0,and (f) 5.0.
The fixation probability, ρC(b/c), were measured from 106 trials at each b/c in range of 3.5 ≤ b/c ≤ 10.0
with interval 0.1 for each configuration, G(γ,r), that independently generated 200 network samples under
the weak selection, w = 0.0095.
4.3 Emergence of cooperation on complex population structures
We have simulated the discrete selection dynamics on the set of population structures that controlled
the degree-heterogeneity and the degree-degree correlation. To avoid the bias from the clustering we
controlled the structure to have low clustering coefficient. We have found several points that were not
discussed in the community so far especially the effect of degree-mixing on the selection of cooperation.
4.3.1 Main observation
As shown in Fig. 4.5, regardless the level of heterogeneity and degree-mixing the fixation probability,
ρC, increasing as the benefit cost ratio, b/c, increased. Differences appeared in the slop of ρC, where we
observed smoothest from the most heterogeneous with the degree exponent, γ = 2.5, while the steepest
from the most homogeneous with the degree exponent, γ = 5.0. We observed also the effect of the
degree-mixing appeared as the tendency that the highest ρC from the most disassortative mixing while
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Fig. 4.6 Threshold b/c∗ for varying degree distributions of the form P ∼ k−γ and degree-degree corre-
lations. Throughout the data points the average degree is constrained at k = 4. Disassortative degree
mixing promotes altruism, sometimes overcompensating for the negative effects of heterogeneous degree
distribution.
the lowest ρC from the most assortative mixing from each level of the degree-heterogeneity, however the
gap between ρC from assortative and disassortative is much bigger in heterogeneous networks.
The threshold b/c∗ from each configuration shows more clearly how the degree-heterogeneity and the
degree-mixing enhance or suppresses the evolution of cooperation. Our results agrees with the previous
discussions on the average degree [49] as shown in Fig. 4.6 that from all configuration b/c∗ > k. It is also
agrees with the discussion that the degree-heterogeneity suppresses cooperation [108] as higher b/c∗ for
the more degree-heterogeneous structure in neutral mixing (r = 0). The effect of degree-mixing is shown
as b/c∗ decreased as the level of degree-mixing varies from assortative to disassortative and the effect
amplified by the degree-heterogeneity.
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Fig. 4.7 Degree of the seed cooperator positively correlates with the fixation probability in the weak
selection strength. γ = (a) 2.5, (b) 3.0, and (c) 5.0 . This tendency, however, becomes saturated for
highly heterogenous and highly assortative networks (lower plots in a). d. The probability of arival when
the cooperation starts from a node whose degree is less than the mean degree, i.e. kseed < k. (d) aw. e.
Higher-degree seeds proceed farther that the lower-degree seeds.
4.3.2 Seed effect
Let us begin discussions from the seed effect. As we saw that in previous chapter under the death-birth
update a node with higher degree has better chance to spread its offspring compare to lower one due to
the influence. However, in the evolutionary game dynamics the fitness is not a constant. Since a seed
cooperator doesn’t have any cooperating neighbor at the beginning, it must endure paying the cost until
it achieve the evolutionary success. The cost paying from the seed proportional to its degree, therefore,
rational guess suggest that starting from higher degree maybe worse compare to starting from low degree
because of the high cost disadvantage.
In fact, if we sort out the fixation events according to the degree of the seed cooperator, as shown in
Fig. 4.7, the “founder effect” clearly indicates the advantage of starting cooperation from a higher-degree
node. This seemingly paradoxical result can be explained by considering the first evolutionary success of
seed cooperator. If cooperation starts at the node 0 of degree k0, the probability can be computed that this
seed node spread the cooperation before death. Once a node, say the node i of degree ki, from the seed’s
neighborhood, N0, is randomly picked for replacement with probability 1/N, the seed node competes
for reproduction with the other ki −1 nodes of Ni. The odds for the seed cooperator to be selected for






(1−w)ki +w(b/cτi − k0)
≡ Sw , (4.23)
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Fig. 4.8 Averaged probability of evolutionary success upto 10 cooperators started from (a) low degree
seed, kseed < k and (b) high degree seed, kseed > 5k. Figure shows the degree of seed effects on the
evolutionary success when the cooperator try to invade the sea of defectors on structured populations.
Starting at low degree nodes, which is the majority of the population in degree-heterogeneous structures,
mostly failed. The probability to reach 10 cooperators starting from low degree nodes less than 0.1.
However, if the seed initiated at hubs the chance of proliferation increased by structural benefit under the
death-birth dynamics. The seed effect, however, amplified by the disassortative mixing and neutralized by
the assortative mixing. Figure obtained on the configuration of γ = 2.5 at b/c = 8.0 and w = 0.0095.
where the cost of cooperation is set to 1 and τi is the number of triangles with the edge (0, i) as a side,
in which the number of common neighbors between 0 and i. Notice that Sw depends, through ki and τi,
on up to the second-order adjacency from the seed. The degree of success of the initial proliferation of
cooperation is now determined based on by how much Sw is greater than 1/N. By replacing τi ∼ 0 with





ki −w(k0 + ki)
. (4.24)
Eq. 4.24 explains the benefit of starting the cooperation at a hub node. In the weak-selection limit,
where fitness is insensitive to the payoff, the seed cooperator may overcompensate the apparent disad-
vantage of excessive exploitation. Note that Eq. 4.24 converges to the influence of node 0 in the limit of
neutral selection, w ∼ 0. As consequence, once taken by either C or D, hubs become the stronghold in
proliferating the strategy.
Fig. 4.8 clearly shows the structural benefit starting from the high degree. Interesting point is the
side effect of the degree-mixing. It is represented that the benefit starting from hub reduced in case of
assortative mixing while enhanced in disassortative mixing compare to neutral Fig. 4.8 (b). Surprisingly,
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we observed that the structural disadvantage initiated at low degree nodes get worse in negative mixing
while enhanced in positive mixing. It can be understood from the feature of positive and negative degree-
mixing that will be discussed in following sections. What the observation indicating is that even early
evolutionary success achieved, it does not continued longer.
4.3.3 Effect of degree heterogeneity
The key spot: Hubs
Despite the apparent benefit of utilizing the most connected nodes as a seed cooperator, the fraction of
those hubs is negligibly small even in scale-free networks. The greater majority of nodes have smaller
degrees than the nominal average, rendering the existence of hubs is not desirable. Thus, it is important to
take the control over hubs. Importance of taking control of hubs for the evolutionary success of cooperators
appeared in their manifest advantage of spreading ability. Regardless what the strategy is, hubs have
high accessibility to the competition for reproduction through the high connectivity. Whenever one of its
neighbor dies hubs trying to spread their identity under the death-birth process. Influence captures the
aspect quantitatively. Thus, if a hub turned into cooperator, cooperators achieves the stronghold that they
can rely on. Further more in the evolutionary game the fitness of individual proportional to the number
of cooperators in neighborhood, the influence of cooperating hub will be increased by its evolutionary
success. On the contrary, if a hub is defector, it is big menace to cooperators. Defector hubs will try to
break down cooperating clusters with its fitness that earned from exploitation. Unless cooperators take
over the hub spot, cooperators exterminated by defector hubs with high probability.
Collecting discussions on the seed effect and influence of hubs we could summarize on the suppression
of cooperation in the degree-heterogeneous population. It is because of the existence of hubs. With a
fixed mean degree ⟨k⟩, as γ decreases, more and more nodes would have degrees lower than the nominal
average, leaving just a few massively connected hubs. The more degree heterogeneous, the more high
degree hubs appear. If hub become a cooperator, cooperators can rely on cooperator hubs as a stronghold
based on its structural benefit of reproduction. However, before cooperators achieve evolutionary success
on hub node, a defector hub in the role of exploiter against cooperators and with exploited payoff it has
high chance to outcompete cooperators at birth competition. At the same time to take over hub spot
cooperator have to face many of competitors due to the high connectivity that hub has. Even in the
case that any of competiting defectors doesn’t have source of exploitation, the probability that a single
cooperator take over the spot inversely proportional to the degree of hub. Therefore, in more and more
heterogeneous structure survival of seed cooperator become more and more difficult. As consequence the
degree-heterogeneity suppresses the emergence of cooperation.
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(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12





































(b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12
Fig. 4.9 The probability of arrival to fC given that the degree of seed cooperator, kseed is k, on disassortative
(a) and assortative (b) structures. The evolutionary success in early stage depends on the degree of seed
cooperator. The arrival probability is increasing as the degree of seed getting higher. However, the
optimum degree of seed for the first few successful steps of spreading cooperators is not the highest
degree, which represent the balance between the initial cost and the utilized structural benefit as a hub.
Notice that the fraction of cooperators, fC, expressed in logarithm scale. b/c = 8.0 and w = 0.0095.
4.3.4 Stages in evolutionary success of cooperation
Major previous studies focused on the fixation probability of cooperation. We were curious about how
cooperators taking over the whole population starting from a single cooperator on complex population
structure, since there is not only structural complexity but also configurational complexity that affects on
the fitness of an individuals. For example, suppose we have a certain fraction of cooperators. The fixation
probability from that fraction on degree-homogeneous structure verses degree-heterogeneous structure at
the same benefit cost ratio will be different, because the relative fitness of an individual against its potential
competitor on each structure depending on the combination of two complexities. To clarify, we quantified
the arrival probability to a certain fraction of cooperators from randomly placed seed cooperator and
the conditional fixation probability from a certain frequency of cooperators. Despite we obtained results
using many structural and dynamic parameters, from now we focus on the results from the assortative
(r = 0.12) and disassortative (r =−0.12) structures which obtained from the most degree-heterogeneous
populations (γ = 2.5). More detailed results from selected structures are represented in Appendix B.
First we investigated how much does cooperation can be proliferated to the population starting from a
single cooperator in average. Fig. 4.9 shows the arrival probability to a certain fraction of cooperators
through the evolutionary success that started from a seed cooperator with degree k. As we expected from
the understanding the seed effect, the evolutionary success in early stage depends on the degree of seed
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(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12





































(b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12
Fig. 4.10 The conditional fixation probability from a certain fraction of cooperators, fC, given that the
degree of seed cooperator, kseed was k on disassortative (a) and assortative (b) structures. There is seed
dependency of the fixation until certain fraction, fC < 0.01 for the disassortative mixing and fC ∼ 1 for the
assortative mixing. The edge between red and yellow domain around fC ∼ 0.05 in (a) clearly independent
from the degree of seed which indicating that the seed dependency disappeared. In (b) the edge between
color domain is noisy due to the rare fixation on assortative mixing. b/c = 8.0 and w = 0.0095.
cooperator. Regardless the level of degree-mixing, there is similar tendency that the arrival probability is
increasing as the degree of seed getting higher. We can notice that the optimum degree of seed for the
first few steps of successful spreading is not the highest degree, which represent the balance between
the initial cost and the utilized structural benefit of reproduction as a hub. Furthermore, there is clear
threshold that the proliferation of cooperation is strongly limited. The edge of limited expansion depends
on the degree-mixing of given structure and the degree of seed but in both cases the threshold can be
observed in range 0.01 < fC < 0.1. On the other hand, if the fraction of cooperator reached more than the
threshold it seems remained as a constant. It means that if the fraction of cooperators is more than the
threshold, evolutionary success of cooperators until the fixation event is ensured.
Fig. 4.10 shows the conditional fixation probability from certain fraction of cooperators, fC, which
arrived from a single cooperator initiated at the node of degree k. As we previously discussed from
the arrival probability there is certain threshold fraction of cooperators that ensure the emergence of
cooperation. However, in this case the threshold seems not really depends on the degree of seed, but
the structural characteristics. We can observe there is seed dependency of the fixation until certain
fraction, fC < 0.01 for the disassortative mixing and fC ∼ 0.1 for the assortative mixing. However,
the seed dependency disappeared at certain point. In Fig. 4.10 (a), in case of disassortative mixing
the edge between red and yellow domain independent from the degree of seed. Above the edge the
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Fig. 4.11 (a) The arival probability to a certain fraction of cooperators from randomly placed single
cooperator,(b) the conditional fixation probability from a certain fraction of cooperators on the structured
population with γ = 2.5 at b/c = 8.0. The stages of evolutionary process of cooperators on structured
populations divided into three, the survival, the expansion and the settle down. The survival stage is the
fraction of cooperators in range of 0 < fC < 3/N. Denote by f ∗C the threshold fraction that guarantees
the fixation, the expansion stage is in range of 2/N < fC < f ∗C . Above the threshold the stage is settle
down. In this figure, the threshold fractions of each configuration, f ∗C(G), strongly depend on the level of
degree-mixing. For the disassortative structure, f ∗C ∼ 0.2 while for the assortative mixing, f ∗C ∼ 1.0, which
represent the selection of cooperation is favoured more on the negatively degree-mixed populations.
conditional fixation probability dramatically increased and around fC ∼ 0.1, which is still the majority
among the total population is defectors, the evolutionary success of cooperators almost guaranteed. It is
strongly suggesting that when the number of cooperator reached at that certain fraction, the combination
of configurational and structural complexity provide sufficient compensation to cooperators and that
assortment is enough to outcompete defectors.
Based on observation we may divide the stages of evolutionary process of cooperation on the
structured population into three, those are the survival, the expansion, and the settle down. In the stage
of survival, a seed cooperator achieves the first evolutionary success or die out. Regardless the benefit
cost ratio and structural characteristics, the first evoluionary success of randomly placed seed cooperator
approximately proportional to the degree of itself over the harmonic mean of neighbors degree under
the weak selection. The optimum seed degree depends on the balance between the initial cost and the
structural benefit. If seed cooperator succeed survive, two cooperators try to expand cluster based on
their reciprocal compensation. Expansion period strongly depends on the compensation for the mutual
cooperation. Higher payoff for reciprocal altruism leads more evolutionary success for cooperators. The
evolutionary success of cooperators for a hub in this stage decide whether continuing expansion of
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cooperating cluster or shirked by robust proliferation of defector hubs. If cooperator cluster expanded
successfully in this chaotic random drift across complex interactions, finally the evolutionary population
system could reach to the point where the fraction of cooperators sufficiently outcompete defectors during
further evolutionary processes. We call this stage as the settle down.
4.3.5 Effect of degree-mixing
Amplifying or neutralizing the seed effect
The effect of degree-mixing observed throughout stages of the evolutionary process. In this part we
focus on the effect of degree-mixing on the emergence of cooperation. We already witnessed the degree-
mixing amplifying or neutralizing the seed effect from the Fig. 4.8. The structural benefit or loss of
reproduction starting at high degree or low degree, respectively, amplified by the negative degree-mixing
and neutralized by the positive mixing. Since, in disassortative mixing, low degree nodes are mostly
connected to high degree nodes, the first cooperator at low degree node under the high influence of D-hub
in neighborhood. Despite of the low cost pressure to the seed, this configuration cause decreasing of
potential evolutionary success and increases the probability of extinction. As the opposite situation, when
a seed cooperator initiated at high degree spot, the cooperator have to pay more cost but the structural
benefit of reproduction amplified by decreased size of the pool for competition, since its neighbors have
poor connectivity. On the other hand, in case of assortative mixing the threat of extinction to low degree
seed decreased by absence of the direct connection from hubs while the structural benefit of reproduction
to hubs also decreased by many number of potential competitors, thus the seed effect is neutralized. As
consequence due to the majority of low degrees among the population, the evolutionary success in the
early stage is slightly better in assortative population as shown in Fig. 4.11 (a).
However, the amplified or neutralized seed effect by degree-mixing pattern conflict to the conditional
fixation probability from the seed of degree, kseed , as we observed in Fig. 4.7. The fixation probability
given the degree of seed, kseed , has tendency which is proportional to the degree of seed kseed . Moreover,
the tendency amplified or neutralized by disassortative or assortative mixing, respectively. The explanation
for that can be found from the settle down threshold, f ∗C , which guarantees further evolutionary success
of cooperators, if evolutionary population of cooperators reached above that number of cooperators.
As shown in Fig. 4.11 (b), the settle down threshold in disassortative mixing much smaller compare
to the assortative mixing. From this observation we can notice that the selection of cooperators during
evolutionary process facilitated by disassortative mixing or suppressed by assortative mixing in the stage
of expansion.
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(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12 (b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12
Fig. 4.12 Visualized example of structural equivalence between the highest degree hubs in (a) disassor-
tative and (b) assortative mixing from the sample network with the degree exponent γ = 2.5. The size
of nodes proportional to their degree. The most connected two hubs, degree of k = 90 and k = 69, are
indicated as two red nodes and common neighbors between them are indicated as blue nodes. The green
color links showing the connection between hubs and others. The number of common neighbors between
two hubs in disassortative mixing is 2 and in assortative mixing is 30. Therefore, hubs in assortative
mixing is much more structually equivalent than in disassortative mixing. The networks in figure share
the degree sequence.
Interference via structural equivalence
The evidence of relative high pressure of suppression to the emergence of cooperation in assortative
mixing can be addressed due to the high structural equivalence between a pair of nodes. In general,
the level of structural equivalence between a pair of individuals in a structured population decide the
similarity of local configuration of strategies for a pair of individuals during the evolutionary dynamics.
As an example, the number of common neighbors between two highest degree hubs is much more in
assortative mixing compare to disassortative one as shown in Fig. 4.12. In this example structure, the pair
of highest degree hubs in the assortative mixing have many of common neighbors, they play the game
with same partners and they also compete for reproduction of their identity toward same targets. If both of
hubs have identical strategy, even they compete each other in individual level their trial for evolutionary
success toward same direction of the selection. However, if they do have opposite strategy against each
other, the direction of evolutionary success of each individual are out of joint and consequently, they do
interfere reproduction against each other. Thus, the interference between a pair of individuals only has
the meaning when the pair have different strategies.
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Fig. 4.13 Interference between pair of hubs, which represented in Fig. 4.12, as function of the total
fraction of cooperators in the population. Navy and blue belong to interference from D-hub to C-hub and
pink and light pink belong to interference from C-hub to D-hub. Interference between hubs in assortative
mixing is much stronger than in disassortative mixing. The strong interference mainly cause the high
barrier against cooperators for taking over hub community in assortative mixing. Figure obtained using
b/c = 8.0 and w = 0.01.
Take account of the interference quantitatively we suggest the following logic. Let consider a pair
of individuals say i and j. When one of common neighbor between them, say l, become a stage of
competition for reproduction from the random death, the pair of individuals join to the competition. It
is reasonable to quantify the strength of interference from j to i as the relative fitness of j compare to
i, f j/ fi. Because in competition for reproduction the interference to i from the competitor, j, meaning
how much is j relatively fitter than i so that reduces the probability of evolutionary success of i. At the
same time, if the competition pool is big, the actual interference from j to i may not big. Therefore, we
rescale the relative fitness with the size of competition pool, that is the degree of common neighbor minus
one, kl −1, since the minimum size of competition happens between two individuals. So we defined the
interference from j to i, Fi j, as the total sum of potential rescaled relative fitness of j against i through
their common neighbors when the two have different strategies,








where si and s j indicate strategies of i and j, respectively.
The interference between two largest hubs in disassortative and assortative mixing during evolutionary
process is shown in Fig. 4.13. As we expected the interference between two hubs is much stronger in
assortative mixing compare to disassortative case. Interference between a pair of individuals proportional
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(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12































(b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12
Fig. 4.14 The averaged local frequency of cooperators around the cooperator of degree k on (a) disas-
sortative and (b) assortative structures when the total fraction of cooperators among the population in
range of 1/N < fC < 0.3, which is early to expansion stage. (a) in disassortative population, cooperator
hubs take over their neighbors at relatively lower fraction of cooperators in the population, since hubs in
disassortative mixing are relatively isolated even cooperator hubs doesn’t have enough compensation or
reciprocity from their neighborhood structural advantage facilitate spreading the strategy. (b) in assortative
mixing cooperator hubs have much less cooperating neighbors around compare to disassortative at the
same level of total cooperators in the population. Rather than around hubs, cooperators are stick together
in low degree spots, k < k. Due to the structural equivalence without accordance of strategies among hubs
as cooperation it requires stronger reciprocity as more cooperator in neighborhood or more compensation
from reciprocal interactions. The average take over the data from 105 of simulations on 200 independently
generated network ensemble of each assortativity. Notice that hubs of degree k > 10 are very rare in each
network sample.b/c = 8.0 and w = 0.0095.
to the structural equivalence, or similarity between them. We confirmed in Ch.2 that similarity between a
pair of nodes is much larger in assortative mixing compare to disassortative mixing as shown in Fig. 2.8.
Expanding our observation of interference between hubs to any pair of nodes in competing position, we
can notice that interference in assortative mixing between any pairs of cooperator and defector is much
stronger than in disassortative mixing. Which mainly cause the higher barrier against cooperators for
taking over population in assortative mixing compare to disassortative mixing.
Fig. 4.14 represent the averaged local frequency of cooperators around a cooperator degree k when
the total fraction of cooperators in the whole population in range 1/N < fC < 0.3, which is early to
expansion stage. As shown Fig. 4.14 (a) in disassortative population, cooperator hubs take over their
neighbors at relatively lower fraction of cooperators in the population, since hubs in disassortative mixing
are relatively isolated, even cooperator hubs doesn’t have enough compensation or reciprocity from their
neighborhood, the structural advantage facilitate spreading the strategy. In case of assortative mixing,
cooperator hubs have much less cooperating neighbors compare to disassortative structure at the same
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Fig. 4.15 Local fraction of coopertors around C-hubs (pink) and D-hubs (blue) in (a) disassortative
structure and (b) assortative structure across the evolutionary process. The gap between local fraction
around cooperating hubs and defecting hubs very small in assortative structure until the global fraction
of cooperators reaches fC ∼ 0.6. In the disassortative mixing from the early stage to the final fixation
the gap is huge. Figure obtained from the statistics of top 5 highest degree nodes of networks γ = 2.5,
r =−0.12 for disassortative and r = 0.12 for assortative degree-mixing. Figure obtained using b/c = 8.0
and w = 0.0095.
level of total cooperators in the population. Rather than hub community cooperators are stick together
in low degree community, k < k as shown in Fig. 4.14 (b). Expansion of cooperating cluster in hub
community from cooperating hubs are obstructed by defector hubs due to the structural equivalence,
and thus without accordance in strategy among hubs as cooperation it requires stronger reciprocity as
more cooperator in neighborhood or more compensation from reciprocal interactions. Notice that the
aligned increment of local cooperators around hubs in assortative mixing as increasing the total fraction
of cooperators in whole population.
Role of hubs: stronghold or barrier
In addition to the interference through the structural equivalence, the exploitation of cooperators by
defector hubs is also depends on the level of structural similarity. Suppose we have a cooperator and
a defector hubs. The evolutionary success of cooperator hub toward one of its neighbors leads the
compensation to cooperator hub in the next round of game. In case of defector hub, its reproduction
leads to decreasing the source of exploitation. However, if the two hubs share common neighbors, the
evolutionary success of cooperator will lead increasing of the absolute fitness not only itself but also to
defector. Since a newly introduced cooperator neighbor is also a neighbor of defector hub, it is under the
exploitation. As the opposite case, the evolutionary success of defector hub leads reducing not only the
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Fig. 4.16 The influence of top 5 hubs during the evolutionary process from network samples of disassor-
tative and assortative mixing that share the degree sequence of γ = 2.5. Since the fitness of individuals
in evolutionary game on structured population depends on the structural and strategic configurations
among individuals, influence varies during dynamics. Regardless what is the strategy of hub, the potential
evolutionary success of hubs in disassortative mixing (a) is much larger than in assortative mixing (b).
Commonly in both cases the influence of C-hubs is smaller than D-hubs, however, above a certain fraction
of cooperators C-hubs being more influential than D-hubs. That points in disassortative mixing is much
lower than assortative mixing. We can also notice that influence of C-hubs in disassortative mixing
explosively increases while in assortative mixing it is gradual. Consequently C-hubs in disassortative
mixing lead the expansion of cooperator cluster.
source of exploitation but also the source of reciprocity for the cooperator hub. Fig. 4.15 showing the
local fraction of cooperators around cooperating hubs and defecting hubs in disassortative and assortative
mixing. As we can see clearly, in disassortative mixing the local fraction of cooperators around C-hub and
D-hub totally separated with huge gap between them, since they have low similarity while in assortative
mixing the gap between them is very small due to the high level of structural similarity. Consequently this
different level of local fraction of cooperators around hubs leads to totally opposite effect on the selection
of cooperation.
Extending discussion of the effect of degree-mixing on the seed effect, the structural advantage
for reproduction of hubs amplified by disassortative mixing and neutralized by assortative mixing. As
shown in Fig. 4.16 the influence of cooperating or defecting hubs is much greater in disassortative
mixing than in assortative of the same degree throughout the level of cooperation in populations. Since
the fitness of individuals in evolutionary game on structured population depends on the structural and
strategic configurations among individuals, influence varies during dynamics. Therefore, the influence of
an individual depends on the local fraction of cooperators.
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(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12




























(b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12
Fig. 4.17 The averaged relative fitness of cooperator of degree k against its potential defector competitors
in (a) disassortative and (b) assortative structures when the total fraction of cooperators in the population
is in range 1/N < fC < 0.3. Relative fitness of cooperator against competing defectors represent potential
competitiveness for reproduction of cooperators during the dynamics. In disassortative mixing, the
relative fitness of cooperator hubs against their potential competitors start outcompete in early stage and
thus cooperating hubs take a role of stronghold. In assortative mixing, the relative fitness of cooperator
hubs not significantly outcompete against their competitors. At the same time, neutralized structural
advantage for reproduction, and strong interference between hubs due to the high structural similarity,
take over hub community requires much higher compensation for mutual cooperation. Thus, massively
interconnected hub community working as the barrier against proliferation of cooperators. Figure obtained
using b/c = 8.0 and w = 0.0095.
In disassortative mixing and the high level of local fraction of cooperators around C-hub leads high
influence of C-hub. As shown in Fig. 4.16, the potential evolutionary success of C-hubs in disassortative
mixing is approximately double compare to same degree C-hubs in assortative mixing. Notice that the
explosive increment of influence in early expansion stage when the total fraction of cooperators in range
1/N < fC < 0.2, Fig. 4.16 (a). It is indicating that if a hub become a cooperator it take a role of stronghold
based on the overwhelming potential evolutionary success. In addition, the relative fitness of cooperator
hubs against potential defecting competitors already outcompete in early stage of evolutionary process as
shown in Fig. 4.17 (a). These multiple factors let the disassortative mixing reduce not only the settle
down point, f ∗C but also the threshold benefit-cost ratio, b/c
∗, and facilitate the emergence of cooperation.
On the contrary, in assortative mixing the relative fitness of cooperator hubs not significantly outcom-
pete against their competitors. Because of the high structural equivalence, the absolute increment of fitness
of cooperating hub as the results of its reproduction does not leads to increment relative fitness against
defector hubs. Therefore, taking over the hub community in assortative mixed population by cooperators
become more difficult. In addition, proliferation of cooperators, especially to hub community, is resisted
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(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12



















(b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12
Fig. 4.18 The heatmap of the conditional fixation probability at b/c from a certain fraction of cooperators,
fC, in which arrived through evolutionary success of cooperators on (a) disassortative and (b) assortative
populations. The required fraction of cooperators, f ∗C which guarantees the success of taking over the
population depends on population structure and the benefit-cost ratio. We can notice that as the b/c
increases the threshold of evolutionary success decreases in both structures. However, the selection of
cooperators in disassortative mixing is much favoured. Above the general network reciprocity, b/c> k = 4,
the threshold quickly decreased in the disassortative mixing (a) while in assortative mixing the threshold
decreases slowly (b). Note that fC axis is log-scaled.
by neutralized structural advantage for reproduction, and strong interference between hubs. These factors
are cause of much higher compensation for mutual cooperation to take over hub community. Thus,
massively interconnected hub community working as the barrier against proliferation of cooperators.
Fig. 4.18 shows the overall results of the conditional fixation probability as function of the fraction
of cooperators, fC, given the benefit-cost ratio, b/c, on disassortative and assortative populations. As
increasing b/c, the threshold fraction ensures the evolutionary success of cooperation decreasing, which
is the edge between yellow and white domain in Fig. 4.18. The tendency of decreasing depends on the
level of degree-mixing due to the effect of degree-mixing during the evolutionary process in strategic
populations as we discussed so far. The effect of degree-mixing, however, is amplified by the degree-
heterogeneity as shown in Fig. 4.6. Since the more degree-heterogeneous, the more fat-tailed degree




In summary, we have explored the emergence of cooperation on the structured population based on the
evolutionary game dynamics. We investigated the synchronous update and asynchronous update on the
characterized population in terms of the degree-heterogeneity and the degree-degree correlation. Under
the synchronous update that imitate the best with comparison the payoff the effect of degree-heterogeneity
turned out the level of cooperation maintained by cooperating hubs.
In case of selection dynamics we measured the fixation probability of cooperator which is the
probability of evolutionary success starting from a single cooperator take over the whole population under
the death-birth update. The interplay between dynamics and population structure utilized as the structural
advantage to high-degree nodes that turned out high influence regardless what the strategy is. Suppression
to the emergence of cooperation in degree-heterogeneous network could be addressed as the combination
of founder effect and robust proliferation of defector hubs in early stage. Taking over defector hubs as a
cooperator hub in early stage mostly decide further evolutionary outcome, however, without sufficient
compensation for mutual cooperation the even occur very rarely.
On the stage of expanding cooperating cluster, the degree-mixing pattern enhance or inhibit the pro-
liferation of cooperators. Main reason of the effect caused by the different level of structural equivalence
between a pair of hubs, which very low in disassortative mixing and very high in assortative mixing.
Structural simiarlity provide the path of interference between individuals with opposite strategies and
also the chance of exploitation to defectors from the evolutionary success of cooperators. In addition the
utilized structural advantage of reproduction for highly connected individuals is amplified by disassorta-
tive mixing but neutralized by assortative mixing. Consequently in disassortative mixing cooperator hubs
take a role of stonghold which facilitate the expansion of cooperating cluster while in assortative mixing




In this dissertation we have explored how structured population affect on the emergence phenomena from
the evolutionary dynamics.
First we investigated evolutionary dynamics on the structured populations. Compare to the Moran
process, that is the birth-death(BD), we observed different outcomes from the dynamics with flipped
order to the death-birth(DB). Previous studies on BD process summerized that population structures
classified into three catagories based on comparison with the Moran fixation, which are the isothermal
structure, the selection suppressor and the selection amplifier. We found that the flipped Moran process
changes the characteristics that defined previously. Significantly different outcome obtained from the star
structure which was the selection amplifier based on BD, turned out it is selection suppressor under DB.
Under the BD process, the temperature of node is defined by the sum of incoming flow of evolutionary
success from its neighborhood. Contrastively for the DB process, we defined the influence of a node
as the sum of outgoing flow of evolutionary success from itself under. It turned out that in case of BD,
initiated low degree node has higher fixation while under the DB fixation proportional to the degree of
seed. Interestingly in case of neutral selection, the temperature of a node is identical to the influence for
unweighted structures as the degree times the harmonic mean of neighbor degrees.
Second we addressed structurally preferred population for the selection of cooperation based on the
evolutionary game theory. From the numerical simulation on generated populations with desired level of
degree-heterogeneity and degree-mixing, we have found that interplay between microscopic dynamics
and the structure leads different macroscopic behavior of the system. From the synchronous update in
which an individual imitate the strategy of the best payoff among neighbors including oneself, hubs
were stronghold to maintain the high level of cooperation under the high temptation. Typically when
degree-degree configuration were mixed, population in the negative and positive mixing showed different
outcomes. From the positively mixed configuration sudden drop of cooperating population observed that
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caused by collapse of cooperating hub cluster. In case of negative mixing, rare chance for imitation from
hub leads sustain initially given strategy.
Comparison with synchronous imitation the selection dynamics based on the death-birth performed.
In the selection dynamics the hubs were distinguished as the object of subjugation for the evolution
of cooperation. Utilized structural benefit of hub for proliferating under the death-birth based on high
connectivity, when hubs become cooperator it take a role of stronghold. However, until cooperator take
over the spot defector hubs are menace for cooperators which is the main source of suppression of
cooperation from the degree-heterogeneity.
Emergence of cooperation on the complex structured population that contain the degree-heterogeneity
and the degree-degree correlation achieved throughout following stages. Survival: the survival of seed
cooperator and its first evolutionary success depends on the degree of seed and the harmonic mean of its
neighbors degree. Unless initiated at high degree node the chance is very low, thus, most of trial failed.
Expansion: after the first evolutionary success, sufficiently enough compensation for mutual cooperation
leads the growth of cooperating cluster. In this stage taking over hubs before extinction decide further
evolution. Once a hub become a cooperator, as the results of evolutionary success fitness increased.
Consequently hubs lead growing of cooperating cluster based on its high fitness. Settle down: Finally
when the size of cooperating cluster arrived at certain fraction cooperation outcompete defection which
depends on the benefit cost ratio and population structure.
Meanwhile, the robustness of cooperator hubs during the process depends on the degree-mixing. We
have found that the structural equivalence between any of two nodes, especially between hubs, get higher
in assortative mixing and lower in disassortative mixing. This structural differences leads different level of
interference between a cooperator hub and a defector hub. In disassortative mixing, hubs are isolated from
other hubs and also have low structural equivalence. From the isolation, a cooperator hub not exposed
under the chance taken over by another defector hub and low structural equivalence allows negligible
interference from a defector hub to a cooperator hub that disturbing evolutionary success. In case of
assortative mixing, evolutionary success of a cooperator hub become a benefit not only to spreader but
also to other defectors through high structural equivalence. Thus, even the absolute fitness of cooperator
hub increased the relative fitness compare to potential competitors not enough to outcompete which leads
to significant interference. Consequently the disassortative mixing facilitate the emergence of cooperation
with relatively lower benefit-cost ratio while the assortative mixing requires higher compensation for
mutual cooperation.
Appendix A
Selection Dynamics on Star Graph
Results of evolutionary dynamics on the star graph were extremely different under the birth-death (BD)
and the death-birth (DB) update rules. The star is selection amplifier under the BD and it is the selection
suppressor under the DB. These extreme difference caused by unbalanced transition probabilities as the
consequence of interplay between update rule and the structure.
Fig. A.1 Schematic description of transition probabilities of evolutionary processes on the star structure.
Light gray represent wild-type with fitness 1, and dark graph represent mutant with fitness r. Transitions
corresponding to increasing and decreasing the number of mutant indicated with dark gray and light
gray arrows respectively. The probabilities are unbalanced due to interplay between update rule and the
structure, under the BD, updating the center is more likely occur rather than updating one of leafs, while
under the DB, updating one of leafs is more likely happens. These unbalances represented as the thickness
of arrows.
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Fig. A.2 Transition probabilities of (a) the birth-death and (b) the death-birth as function of the number
of mutants on star graph size of N = 50, the relative fitness of mutant r = 1.5. Transition probabilities
are unbalanced on star graph. Under the BD, transition of the center much more likely happens rather
transitions of leafs. Under the DB, however, it is totally opposite. The interplay between limited interac-
tions though the center and the sequence of dynamics leads this unbalanced transitions. Consequently the
center is super ”hot” spot under the BD and it is super influencer under the DB, which contributes for
amplifying or suppressing the selection respectively.
The states of star, say m, with m mutant divided into two depends on the state of center node, h. In
Fig. A.1 possible transitions are represented as arrows. Since leaf nodes interacting only with the center
node, increasing or decreasing number of mutant among leafs depends on which type is occupying the
center. There are four possible transitions as follows. T−m,h=W : the probability of decreasing one mutant
when the center is wild-type, T+m,h=M: the probability of increasing one mutant when the center is mutant,
T−m,h:M→W : the probability of decreasing one mutant as the center updated from mutant to wild-type,
and T+m,h:W→M: the probability of increasing one mutant as the center updated from wild-type to mutant.








































As represented in Fig. A.2 the sequence of updating rule changes the unbalance transitions. Under the
BD, transition of the center (T+m,h:W→M,T
−
m,h:M→W ) much more likely happens rather transitions of leafs
(T+m,h=M,T
−




























Fig. A.3 Probability of arrival to state m from randomly placed a single mutant with relative fitness r
under (a) the birth-death and (b) the death-birth as function of the number of mutants on star graph size
of N = 100. Under the BD mutant survive and proliferate its identity to whole population while under the
DB survival of a seed mutant is very difficult unless it placed at the center. Notice that y-axis of (b) is
log-scaled.
though the center and the sequence of dynamics leads this unbalanced transitions. Consequently the
center is super ”hot” spot under the BD and it is super influencer under the DB, which contributes for
amplifying or suppressing the selection respectively.
In Fig. A.3 the probability of arrival to state m from a randomly placed seed mutant with the relative
fitness r is represented. Note that on star graph, most of seed mutant initiated at leaf node. Under the BD,
the evolutionary success of seed to the center easily achieved (m = 1 → m = 2), however, spread mutant
from the center to other leaf depends on the relative fitness. In case of DB, most of the seed wiped out by
the center at the beginning as shown in Fig. A.3 (b).
In Fig. A.4 the conditional fixation probability from the state m given the relative fitness of mutant r,
ρM(r,m/N), is represented. Under the BD, the fixation of mutant is guaranteed only with few mutants.
Since, the probability that the center is mutant is proportional to the number of mutant among the leaf, as
many of leaf is occupied by mutant, the fixation get easier Fig. A.4 (a). Meanwhile, under the DB, the
evolutionary success of mutant extremely depends of on the center. Most of invasion from leafs failed
as shown in Fig. A.3 (b), however, if the center taken over by mutant, proliferation of mutant get much
easier as shown in Fig. A.4 (b). We can see the sudden increase of the conditional fixation probability at
ρM(r,2/N).


































Fig. A.4 Conditional fixation probability from the state m given the relative fitness of mutant r, ρM(r,m/N)
under (a) the birth-death and (b) the death-birth on star graph, size of N = 100. Under the BD the fixation
probability gradually increased as the number of mutant increasing. Under the DB, the fixation extremely
depends on the center. Once the center become a mutant type (m = 1 → m = 2), fixation probability
suddenly increased as shown as the edge between black domain (m = 1) and the yellow (m = 2) in (b).
Appendix B
Various Quantification of Cooperativity in
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
To investigate how the degree-heterogeneity and the degree-mixing affect to the emergence of cooperation
we measured following list of quantities.
• Conditional arrival probability: the probability that the total fraction of cooperator arrived to
fC from a single cooperator initiated at node of degree k. The arrival probability measure the
evolutionary success of cooperators on each characterized structured populations. We confirmed
that the optimum degree of seed for most successful proliferation is not the most connected node,
but balanced between the initial cost and the structural advantage for reproduction as highly
connected spot, depending on the level of degree-heterogeneity.
• Conditional fixation probability: the probability of fixation from a certain fraction of cooperators
that reached through the evolutionary success from a seed cooperator initiated at node degree k.
From the conditional fixation probability we found that the threshold fraction of cooperators, f ∗C ,
which guarantees further evolutionary success upto the fixation depends on the level of degree-
heterogeneity and the degree-mixing.
• Probability of finding cooperators at node of degree k: the probability that find a cooperator of
degree k when the total fraction of cooperators in population is fC. This probability indicating how
cooperators taking over populations through the evolutionary success, and how cooperators are
distributed in the population.
• Local fraction of cooperators: the probability that find a cooperator around a cooperator of
degree k when the total fraction of cooperators in population is fC. The local fraction of cooperators
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around cooperator of degree k shows how the degree-mixing pattern effect on the influence of hubs.
The disassortative mixing amplified the influence of hubs which leads hubs as the stronghold for
cooperating clusters and the assortative mixing neutralized it which leads hub community working
as barrier against invading cooperators.
• Relative fitness of cooperators: the averaged one-in-one relative fitness of cooperators against
their potential competing defectors when the total fraction of cooperators in population is fC. The
relative fitness represent the potential evolutionary success of cooperators. Since the fitness of
individuals under the evolutionary game dynamics depends on their payoffs, the relative fitness of
cooperators increases as the local fraction increases.
• Overall conditional fixation probability: the probability of fixation from a certain fraction of
cooperators given the benefit-cost ratio, ρC( fC,b/c). The overall conditional fixation probability
summerize the effect of given structural characteristics of population on the evolution of cooperation.
The critical threshold, fC(b/c)∗, which is the settle down point, strongly depends on the level of
degree-heterogeneity and the level of degree-mixing.
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(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12





































(b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.0





































(c) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12
































(d) γ = 3.0,r =−0.24
































(e) γ = 3.0,r = 0.0
































(f) γ = 3.0,r = 0.24




























(g) γ = 5.0,r =−0.75




























(h) γ = 5.0,r = 0.0




























(i) γ = 5.0,r = 0.75
Fig. B.1 The probability of arrival to fC at b/c = 8.0 that the degree of seed cooperator, kseed was k on
each characterized structure. Survival of seed cooperators and upto few evolutionary success depends on
the degree of seed, kseed . If the seed is placed at high degree spot it take advantage. However, most of
trial invasion from seed cooperator into the sea of defectors wiped out in early stage since the majority of
population is low degree. Notice that the total fraction of cooperators, fC, in logarithm scale.
86 Various Quantification of Cooperativity in Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
Conditional fixation probability





































(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12





































(b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.0





































(c) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12
































(d) γ = 3.0,r =−0.24
































(e) γ = 3.0,r = 0.0
































(f) γ = 3.0,r = 0.24




























(g) γ = 5.0,r =−0.75




























(h) γ = 5.0,r = 0.0




























(i) γ = 5.0,r = 0.75
Fig. B.2 The conditional fixation probability at b/c = 8.0 from a certain fraction of cooperators, fC, given
the degree of seed cooperator, kseed was k on each characterized structure. The threshold, f ∗C , depends on
the level of degree-heterogeneity and the degree-mixing. The more heterogeneous, the higher threshold,
and the more disassortative, the lower threshold.
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Probability of finding cooperators at node of degree k































(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12































(b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.0































(c) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12


























(d) γ = 3.0,r =−0.24


























(e) γ = 3.0,r = 0.0


























(f) γ = 3.0,r = 0.24






















(g) γ = 5.0,r =−0.75






















(h) γ = 5.0,r = 0.0






















(i) γ = 5.0,r = 0.75
Fig. B.3 Probability of finding cooperators at node of degree k at b/c = 8.0 when the total fraction of
cooperators in the population is fC on each characterized structure. Figure is showing that the probability
find cooperating hub is slightly higher in disassortative mixing compare to assortative mixing at the same
level of total fraction.
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Local fraction of cooperators































(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12































(b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.0































(c) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12


























(d) γ = 3.0,r =−0.24


























(e) γ = 3.0,r = 0.0


























(f) γ = 3.0,r = 0.24






















(g) γ = 5.0,r =−0.75






















(h) γ = 5.0,r = 0.0






















(i) γ = 5.0,r = 0.75
Fig. B.4 The local fraction of cooperators around the cooperator of degree k at b/c = 8.0 when the total
fraction of cooperators in the population is fC on each characterized structure. The local statistics showing
how hubs in disassortative mixing governing its local neighborhoods based on the utilized structural
benefit for reproduction and take a role of stronghold. The local fraction of cooperators around C-hub in
disassortative mixing is much higher compare to the case of assortative mixing. Due to the high structural
similarity among hubs cooperating hubs under the high interference which working as a barrier against
cooperators.
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Relative fitness of cooperators




























(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12




























(b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.0




























(c) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12























(d) γ = 3.0,r =−0.24























(e) γ = 3.0,r = 0.0























(f) γ = 3.0,r = 0.24



















(g) γ = 5.0,r =−0.75



















(h) γ = 5.0,r = 0.0



















(i) γ = 5.0,r = 0.75
Fig. B.5 The averaged relative fitness of cooperator of degree k against its potential defector competitors
at b/c = 8.0 when the total fraction of cooperators in the population is fC on each characterized structure.
Based on direct and strong reciprocity, C-hubs in disassortative structure take advantage in early stage.
However, the effect of degree-mixing neutralized when the structure is degree-homogeneous since highly
connected is absent.
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Overall conditional fixation probability



















(a) γ = 2.5,r =−0.12



















(b) γ = 2.5,r = 0.0



















(c) γ = 2.5,r = 0.12



















(d) γ = 3.0,r =−0.24



















(e) γ = 3.0,r = 0.0



















(f) γ = 3.0,r = 0.24



















(g) γ = 5.0,r =−0.75



















(h) γ = 5.0,r = 0.0



















(i) γ = 5.0,r = 0.75
Fig. B.6 The conditional fixation probability from a certain fraction of cooperators in which arrived
through evolutionary success of from a seed cooperator, fC, given b/c. The required fraction of coopera-
tors, f ∗C which guarantees the success of taking over the population depends on population structure. Note
that fC axis is log-scaled.
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